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INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has been engaging in
unprecedented levels of legal reform. In the past eight years alone, the
National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee, which
together constitute the central government's legislative arm, have passed over
150 laws, representing nearly one third of the national-level legislation ever
enacted during the PRC's fifty-year history.' These new laws range from
commercial legislation designed to facilitate economic development2 to laws
that expand procedural protections for criminal defendants3 to laws that permit
ordinary citizens to sue the government for redress of official misconduct.4 In
some instances, new laws have fundamentally altered the nation's legal
1. Compare NPC Deputies Acclaim Accelerated Legislation, Xinhua Eng. Newswire, Mar.
11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2795981 (stating that 118 laws were passed by the Eighth NPC, whose
term lasted from 1993 through 1997), Ninth Chinese NPCAdopts 21 Laws, ASIA PULSE, Feb. 3, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 5083567 (stating that 21 laws were passed between March 1998 and February
1999), and ZUIXIN LIFA [NEWLY PASSED LEGISLATION] (visited Jan. 4, 2000)
<http://www.chinalawinfo.comzxlf/index.asp> (listing 16 laws passed between March 1999 and
December 1999), with MINxIN Pm, LEGAL REFORM AND SECURITY OF ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS IN
CHINA tbls. 1 & 2 (1999) (showing that the central government promulgated 334 laws, resolutions, and
amendments to existing laws between 1949 and 1993).
2. Important pieces of commercial legislation passed during the past several years include
the Arbitration Law (1995), the Company Law (1993), the Insurance Law (1995), the Securities Law
(1998), the Trademark Law (1993), and the Unified Contract Law (1999).
3. See, e.g., Criminal Procedure Law, pt. III, ch. II, § 1, art. 162(3) (1996) (creating a
presumption of innocence); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CHINA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 6-7 (1999) (visited Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/
www/global/human rights/1998hrpreport/china.html> [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT] (describing the revised Criminal Procedure Law (1996) as expanding defendants' right
to counsel, establishing a more transparent trial process, and abolishing one form of pretrial detention).
4. See, e.g., Administrative Litigation Law (1991) (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://www.chinalawinfo.con Freelaw/Showframe.cgi> (creating a framework for citizens to challenge
administrative decisions in court); State Compensation Law, arts. 4, 9 (1994) (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://www.chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/Showframe.cgi> (permitting citizens to sue the government for
compensation for government malfeasance); see also Administrative Review Law (1999) (visited Apr.
23, 2000) <http://www.chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/Showframe.cgi> (creating appeals process for
citizens whose rights have been infringed upon by the government).
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landscape, creating bodies of rights that did not exist before the PRC began its
transformation from a command economy toward a market-oriented system.5
Today, the legislative flurry continues as important pieces of legislation
continue to work their way through the legislative process.
6
Paralleling this explosion in legislation are efforts to elevate the quality
of the legal profession, 7 to curb corruption within legal institutions, 8 to
improve legal education, 9 to raise public knowledge of legal affairs, 10 and to
5. One notable example is the birth of property rights. Whereas prior to recent reforms, the
PRC followed communist doctrine forbidding private ownership of land, more recent laws permit
private parties to hold interests in real property. These interests take the form of freely transferable,
long-term, land-use rights, which render the holder the de facto equivalent to the owner of the land, even
though ownership in fee simple is itself still prohibited. See Patrick Randolph, Chinese Real Property
Law (visited Dec. 17, 1998) <http:lwww.qis.netlchinalaw/othrlawl.htr> (arguing that land-use rights
in the PRC should be considered to be property rights).
6. Legislation that the NPC is expected to pass in the near future includes a new bankruptcy
law that will cover both state-owned enterprises and private-sector businesses, major revisions to the
marriage law, a law tightening oversight over government officials, and a law on the legislative process
itself. See, e.g., China Revises Bankruptcy Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1998, at 4 (discussing
proposed replacement for the current Bankruptcy Law); Draft Marriage Law Draws Controversy,
CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13494982 (discussing draft of a new
Marriage & Family Law); Law To Supervise Government, BEIJING REv., June 2, 1997, available in 1997
WL 10063018 (discussing the Law on the Supervision of Government Staff); Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan,
Law Aims To End Conflict at Top Level, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 19, 2000, at 7 (discussing the
proposed Legislation Law).
7. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM? 8 (1996)
("[The Chinese government] has sought to strengthen and professionalize key legal institutions by
training thousands of new policemen, prosecutors and judges."); Training Programmes Benefit Chinese
Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20478305 (discussing joint Sino-British
lawyer-training program); U.S. Lawyers To Help China Organize Independent Bar, LAWYER, Aug. 11,
1998, available in 1998 WL 9168012 (discussing legal-training cooperation between the American Bar
Association and the All China Lawyers Association); see also Reforming Chinese Politics: No Big
Bang, But Changes Continue on Several Fronts, ASIAWEEK, Sept. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL
13177718 [hereinafter Reforming Chinese Politics] (mentioning efforts to professionalize lawyers and
train judges).
On the legislative front, reform appears in the Lawyers Law (1996) (last modified Apr. 7, 1998)
<http:lwww.qis.netlchinalaw/prclaw58.htm>, which specifies new qualification requirements for
Chinese attorneys; the Judges Law (1995) (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.chinalawinfo.
com/Freelaw/ShowLawtextcontent.cgi?lib=htm&filename=7\htm 7.087>, which encourages judicial
independence; and the Procurators Law (1995) (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http://www.chinalawinfo.
com/Freelaw/ShowLawtextcontent.cgi?lib=htm&filename=8\htm_8.086>, aiming to improve the quality
of the government's prosecutorial staff.
8. See, e.g., China Gets Tough on Corruption in Judiciary, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 26, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7597412 (discussing a national campaign against corruption in the judiciary);
Further Law Agency Reviews Supported, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20478990
(discussing anti-corruption campaign in Beijing); Judges Honoured for Services to Justice, CHINA
DAILY, Oct. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20478627 (discussing the results of the Supreme People's
Court's and the Supreme People's Procuratorate's joint anti-corruption campaign); New Rules Improve
Judicial Safeguards, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7597642 (discussing a new
regulation to discipline judges who mishandle cases).
9. See, e.g., Lawyers Meet at "Milestone Event," CHINA DAILY, Sept. 29, 1998, available in
1998 WL 20478049 (describing example of cooperation between Chinese and German law schools);
Official Stresses Importance of Legal Education for China, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, June 22, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 13492986 ("China plans to improve legal education ... senior officials and
scholars said in Beijing. .. .').
10. See, e.g., China Trial Airs Nationwide for First Time, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 13, 1998,
2000]
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increase public participation in legislative drafting." Between 1990 and 1998,
the number of licensed attorneys in the PRC more than doubled from 40,000
lawyers to over 100,000 lawyers. 12 Civil litigation between private citizens
has grown steadily since the mid-1980s,13 indicating greater public confidence
in court adjudication and greater public awareness of rights in general.
Citizens are also increasingly turning to the courts to fight official
misfeasance. As part of its program to curb abuse by law-enforcement
personnel, Chinese officials have encouraged limited though unprecedented
press coverage of police misconduct."5 The NPC, formerly considered to be a
rubber-stamp legislature, has emerged as an independent political force and
has actively sought to make the Chinese legislative process more
representative. 16 Local legislatures have followed suit.17 In its most recent
at 7 (suggesting that television broadcast of trials can encourage public scrutiny of the courts); A
Historic First: Rights Listed on Cards, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20478758
(discussing the procuracy's efforts to increase transparency and the Supreme People's Procuratorate's
order that prosecutors present suspects, victims, and witnesses with cards informing them of their
rights); New Weekend Court Welcomed by People, CHINA DAILY, July 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7596799 (discussing the efforts of one Beijing court to publicize "the importance of knowing about the
legal system"); see also Luo QIzHI, LEGAL AID PRACTICES IN THE PRC IN THE 1990s-DYNAMIcs,
CONTENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 13 (1997) (discussing plans beginning in 1986 to "equip all citizens with
legal common knowledge"); Reforming Chinese Politics, supra note 7 (mentioning efforts to "increase
public awareness about the law and its applications").
11. See, e.g., Democratic Legislation To Produce Better Laws, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 28, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 20477964 (discussing publication of a draft of the Unified Contract Code for
public comment); Law To Advance Democracy, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL
20478042 (discussing publication of the revised draft of the Village Committee Organization Law for
public comment); see also Public Opinions Incorporated in Law, Xinhua Eng. Newswire, Aug. 29,
1998, available in 1998 WL 12181315 (quoting Li Peng as describing the publication of draft laws for
public comment as "a form of bringing public participation into play in running the [PRC]"). Most
commentary, however, does not come from ordinary citizens but from scholars and interested groups.
Cf ACLA Interview A (discussing government solicitation of lawyers' viewpoints when the NPC was
drafting the Lawyers Law (1996) (last modified Apr. 7, 1998) <http://www.qis.net/chinalaw
prclaw58.htm>).
12. See William P. Alford, Tasseled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and
Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, 1995 CHINA Q. 22, 30; Legal Service Sector To Open
Wider to Foreigners, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7597299. The number of
lawyers in the PRC is expected to rise to 150,000 by the year 2000. See RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM,
LAWYERS IN CHINA: OBSTACLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND THE DEFENSE OF RIGHTS 29 (1998).
13. See Is China Democratizing?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL
12052602 ("From 1986 to 1996, commercial litigation cases increased 387 percent, lawsuits against the
government 12,483 percent, and civil lawsuits 212 percent.").
14. See Erik Eckholm, Please, Mr. Bureaucrat, Hear My 20-Year-Old Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 1998, at A4; Elisabeth Rosenthal, A Day in Court, and Justice, Sometimes, for the Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Rosenthal, A Day in Court]; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Police
Abuses Start To Get Attention in China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Rosenthal, Police
Abuses].
15. See Rosenthal, Police Abuses, supra note 14.
16. See Michael W. Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National
People's Congress, 11 CoLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 1 (1997); Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics
in China's Post-Mao Law-Making System, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 56, 64
(Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); see also Murray Scot Tanner, How a Bill Becomes a Law in China, 1995
CHINA Q. 39, 57 ("The most significant change in the lawmaking process since 1979 is unquestionably
that the stage of NPC debate and review is no longer a perfunctory look or a simple public show of
'socialist democracy.' Now, . . . few if any laws pass through NPC review without substantive
amendment .... C').
17. See Kathy Chen, China's Press and Politics Show a Little Gumption as Reforms Speed
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party congress, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially embraced the
development of the rule of law as a national priority,18 committing the
Chinese leadership to building strong legal institutions, to cultivating a legal
culture within all levels of society, and to instilling administrative regularity
within the government bureaucracy. Soon thereafter, in March 1999, the NPC
amended the Chinese Constitution to state expressly that the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land and that the PRC shall be ruled in accordance
with the law.19 Many outside observers believe this commitment to the
establishment of the rule of law to be genuine,20 even though they expect the
CCP itself to remain above the law for the near future.21
Notwithstanding these achievements, the Chinese legal system remains
severely underdeveloped in many respects and will encounter further
problems as it faces new demands from a rapidly growing economy.
Currently, nebulous laws, confusion over regulatory jurisdiction, and a lack of
transparency detract from legal certainty.22 Chinese officials estimate that
Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1998, at A16; Academic Interview A.
18. See Jurists Welcome Leadership's Promotion of "Rule of Law," CHINA DAILY, Apr. 30,
1996, at 4; Li Outlines NPC's Trans-Century Goal, CHINA Bus. INFo. NETWORK, Mar. 20, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7561080; see also Sunny Goh, Jiang "on Tightrope Between Freedom and Social
Stability," STRAITs TIMES, Jan. 20, 1999, at 19 (stating that democracy, human rights, and rule of law
"are no longer regarded as alien" to the CCP); Political Reform Reappears, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT CouNTRY REPORT: CHINA 4TH QUARTER 1998, Nov. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22843462
(mentioning speech during the Fifteenth CCP National Congress, during which President Jiang Zemin
called for reinforcing the rule of law).
19. See Session Votes Amendments, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL
5968309; see also Justice Minister Pledge To Safeguard Amended Constitution, CHINA Bus. INFO.
NETWORK, Mar. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5618573 (quoting Justice Minister Gao Changli as
saying that the incorporation of the principle of rule of law into the PRC Constitution "indicates a major
change in the form of government and leadership").
20. See Kathy Chen, China Studies Moving Closer to Democracy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July
23, 1998, at 1 ("Besides encouraging China's legislature and media to play a greater watchdog role to
ensure effective law enforcement, [Chinese] leaders have sought to increase their understanding of the
importance of establishing a sound legal system.'); Academic Interview A.
21. See, e.g., China Reforming Political System, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Dec. 1, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 8244220 (quoting the PRC Minister of Justice as saying that implementation of the rule of
law should not "weaken the leadership of the [CCP]" nor "negate the leadership of the [CCP]'); Erik
Eckhoim, China To Try Two Dissidents But Denies Them Lawyers, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1998, at A13
('Through arrests and other actions, the authorities have made clear that the leadership's constant talk of
'political reform' and 'rule of law' does not mean competing political groups will be allowed.'); Is
China Democratizing?, supra note 13 (asserting that legal reform will not "threaten the CCP's nle");
Rosenthal, Police Abuses, supra note 14 ("[T]he desire to provide more even-handed justice does not
extend to those who threaten Communist Party rule.'); Academic Interview A.
22. See BUsINESS REGULATION: INTRODUCING CHINA'S BUSINESS LAWS AND PRACTICE 2-
195 (1999) ('Chinese laws are notoriously vague, broadly formulated, representing broad statements of
policy rather than technical pronouncements of rights and duties.') [hereinafter BusINEsS REGULATION];
China Completes Financial-Sector Reforms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1998, at 6 (discussing the
proliferation of contradictory regulations); Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's
Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control, 141 CHINA Q. 155, 176 (1995) (identifying bureaucratic
interference, "lack of uniformity and consistency in interpreting and implementing rules and
regulations," and the levying of arbitrary fees as the top complaints among Americans doing business in
the PRC, as well as discussing conflicting regulations issued by the People's Bank of China and tax
authorities).
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nearly ten thousand cases were incorrectly prosecuted or wrongly decided in
the first eight months of 1998 alone.23 Administrative agencies, especially at
the local level, often ignore the bounds of their delegated authority.24 Local
protectionism prejudices court adjudication and obstructs the enforcement of
judgments.2 5 The judiciary suffers from inadequate training, with the majority
of'judges having been appointed to the bench without prior legal experience.2
6
Similar problems plague the procuracy and the nation's administrative
organs. The demand for legal services has skyrocketed as the legal system
has become more complex, reaching beyond the point at which ordinary
citizens can understand the system on their own. At the same time, the
privatization of law firms has given attorneys the freedom to shun low-profit
cases for the more lucrative practice of corporate law. 29 Among the concerns
raised by this shift is the fear that the common Chinese citizen will be unable
to afford adequate representation and that Chinese lawyers will begin to see
the practice of law in purely financial terms rather than as a profession with
social obligations.
30
In short, a holistic view of the current state of the Chinese legal system
shows a country committed to legal reform but confronted with a daunting
task. The questions that remain most difficult to answer are those concerning
the methods for accomplishing legal reform: What efforts can the government
undertake? What role can nongovernmental actors play? How can official
efforts and private efforts be coordinated? These questions, in turn, implicate
23. See Daniel Kwan, Fine Line To Be Tread in Judging Nation's Judges, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Mar. 1, 1999, at 8.
24. See David L. Weller, Note, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for
Foreign Investors To Challenge AgencyAction, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1238, 1249-53 (1998).
25. See Frank Ching, Rough Justice: The Law Is No Longer an Ass, But Many Judges Still
Are, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 20, 1998, available in WL-FEER 13866665; Bay Fang, New Class
Struggle: Lawsuits Serve Interests of the Masses, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Mar. 19, 1998, available in 1998
WL-FEER 6521448; Jiang Ping, Chinese Legal Reform: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, 9 J.
CHINEsE L. 67, 73 (1995); Judicial Fairness Guaranteed, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 18, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7597399; see also Beiing To Speed Up Judgment Enforcement, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 10, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7597977 ("In the past several years, unenforced court decisions have marred the
prestige of the law and have caused widespread criticism."); Matthew D. Bersani, The Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards in China, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 47, 49 (1993) (quoting the President of the Supreme
People's Court as saying that "local protectionism has seriously affected the judicial work of the
courts').
26. See Alford, supra note 12, at 31; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Lesson of the Triple Twisted
Pine: Plum Blossoms on Mountain Peaks and the Future of the Rule of Law in Hong Kong, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 637, 653 (1997); see also Ignorance of Rule of Law Hampers Work of Chinese Courts,
CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWoRK, Nov. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13495339 ("Ignorance about the rule
of law and a lack of transparency in corporate affairs have hampered the work of Chinese courts .... ").
27. See Academic Interview A; see also Ching, supra note 25 (criticizing the appointment of
Han Zhubin, a man with no judicial experience, as the PRC's top prosecutor). One law professor
estimates that fewer than 10% of the personnel in the nation's administrative agencies have had legal
training. See Academic Interview A.
28. See Luo, supra note 10, at 12.
29. See id. at 15-18.
30. See id. at 18; Huang Zhiling, State's Legal Aid System Helps the Needy, CHINA DAILY,
May 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8259060; cf Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Aid and Public Interest
Law in China 22 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that the demand for legal
aid might be "itself a product of widening gaps" between the rich and poor).
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broader policy questions: To what extent should constituencies outside the
central government be allowed to influence legal reform? Should the reform
movement be popularized? How can the reform process be structured in a way
that will move the PRC toward a more democratic future, notwithstanding the
CCP's desire to remain firmly entrenched in power?
This Article seeks to answer these questions by examining the role of
Chinese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in advancing the rule of law.
It asserts that the development of a strong nonprofit sector can facilitate the
development of the rule of law in the PRC, and as such, the activities of
Chinese NGOs involved in legal reform should be supported and expanded. In
support of this thesis, I argue primarily by way of inductive reasoning, using
examples of current NGO activity to illustrate ways in which the PRC's
burgeoning nonprofit sector has advanced the rule of law. I also rely heavily
on utilitarian arguments, focusing on the ability of NGOs to supplement the
state and the private sector in creating, maintaining, and supporting the
institutional structures necessary for an effective legal regime. The target
audience is both American and Chinese, with the goals being (1) to illustrate
to the former that there is a young but important nonprofit presence in the
Chinese legal arena, and (2) to argue to the latter that the expansion of this
presence is consistent with the Chinese government's goals for legal reform.
Structurally, this Article is divided into three parts. Part I establishes the
context for my argument. It defines five goals that Chinese legal reformers
should strive to achieve and then tackles the sticky issue of defining the term
"NGO" in a country where the state plays a pervasive role in all parts of
society. Part II consists of case studies of eight Chinese NGOs that are active
in the legal arena. Each case study examines the activities of a particular
NGO, evaluating the extent to which the NGO has been successful in
advancing a certain aspect of the rule of law. The objective of Part II is to
provide examples of the different ways that Chinese NGOs have participated
in legal reform and to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each
approach. Part III assesses whether Chinese NGOs can indeed play a
substantial role in encouraging legal reform. Part III identifies common
obstacles encountered by the NGOs profiled in Part II, with the aim being to
delineate the parameters under which Chinese NGOs may operate and to
identify problems that must be overcome if Chinese NGOs are to expand their
role in shaping legal reform. Key issues discussed in Part III include (1)
logistical obstacles to NGO activity, (2) political constraints on NGO
autonomy, and (3) the impact the new Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations, 31 which the State Council promulgated
on November 6, 1998, will have on NGO autonomy.
31. Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (1998) (visited
Apr. 21, 2000) <http:llwww.chinalawinfo.comlFreelaw/ShowFrame.cgi>. This regulation is the first
significant regulation on NGO activity that the PRC has promulgated in nearly a decade. It supersedes
the previous Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, which had been
2000]
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In examining the nonprofit sector's role in the development of the rule
of law in the PRC, I acknowledge that the meaning of "rule of law" is itself a
contested concept, with most views following either Lon Fuller's
instrumentalist view or John Rawls's substantive view.32 Because the CCP
regards law as a tool for advancing state policy33-in essence an
instrumentalist view-the view adopted in this Article is also largely
instrumentalist, especially in its evaluation of the efficacy of NGOs in
promoting legal reform. Such analysis remains focused on the extent to which
NGO activity contributes to the development of a coherent, reliable legal
regime, regardless of whether the underlying substantive law affirms liberal
values. My slant is positivist, expressing a willingness to deem a nation to be
under the rule of law once adherence to legal rules can be shown to be a
defining feature of its political system, even if the opportunity for meaningful
political opposition does not exist. Yet insofar as this Article appeals to
democratic principles to support an expansion of NGO activity, I also
incorporate substantive theories on the rule of law into my argument. In other
words, although the question of whether a nation follows the rule of law is
separate from the question of whether it is a democracy, the development of
institutions that are conducive to the development of both rule of law and
democracy should be preferred over the development of institutions that
advance only the rule of law.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND STATE-LED CIVIL SOCIETY
A. The Features of a Stable Legal System
Legal scholars disagree over the meaning of the rule of law,34 but certain
attributes appear to be essential:
35
in effect since October 1989 and which had been adopted as part of the CCP's post-Tiananmen clamp-
down on politically oriented organizations. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Section III.B.
32. The instrumentalist view of the rule of law focuses on the use of legal rules to structure
human behavior. This view de-emphasizes the use of law as an expression of substantive ideals, such as
democracy, fairness, or individual dignity, because the law itself creates its own internal morality. The
substantive view resembles the instrumentalist view in that it also regards a legal system as a coercive
order of rules designed to regulate conduct. The substantive view, however, departs from the
instrumentalist view in its belief that the goals the legal system seeks to accomplish must conforn with
liberal values. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781,
783-92 (1989) (comparing Lon Fuller's instrumentalist view with John Rawls's substantive view). For
more detail, compare LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-3 8 (rev. ed. 1969), with JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971).
33. See BILL BRUGGER & STEPHEN REGLAR, POLITICS, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 180-81 (1994); Mark C. Lewis, Note, Contract Law in the People's Republic of
China-Rule or Tool: Can the PRC's Foreign Economic Contract Law Be Administered According to
the Rule of Law?, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 500-01 (1997). For a detailed account of the CCP's
legal ideology, see generally Edward J. Epstein, Law andLegitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC
LAw REFORMS IN POST-MAo CHINA, supra note 16, at 19.
34. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 10-24 (1997) (describing four conceptions of the rule of law); Radin, supra note
32, at 783 ("The complex of ideas thought to comprise the Rule of Law is not completely canonical.").
35. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional
Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 149, 151 (1987) (listing A.V. Dicey's three criteria); Fallon, supra
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(1) The existence of stable, comprehensible rules, which have
been publicized in advance to those who are responsible for
obeying them.
(2) The existence of an effective state apparatus to enforce such
rules uniformly, fairly, and consistently.
(3) The supremacy of law over power, with the law delineating
the parameters for the legitimate use of state power and
serving as a constraint on the ability of government officials
to abuse the power or discretion delegated to them.
(4) The creation of a legal culture that affirms the role of law in
maintaining social order; social acceptance of the methods by
which legal rule shall be implemented.
These attributes define the rule of law as a sociopolitical ideal to be
superimposed upon a network of institutions designed to bring its goals to
fruition. Put in layman's terms, the rule of law requires (1) that there be
legitimate law, (2) that there be a legal system to apply such law justly, and
(3) that the citizenry and the government know and obey the law's precepts.
As a theoretical matter, meeting these requirements involves articulating
principles of legality by which the system will operate. As a technical matter,
however, the challenge inures in creating, strengthening, and coordinating the
institutions and processes through which the rule of law is to be realized.
A modem legal system contains a number of basic functional elements,
which range from discrete bodies of law, to judicial organs, to the existence of
a legal profession.36 Each of these elements presupposes the existence of other
elements, and each is integrated with other elements to form a comprehensive,
functioning system.37 For an instrumentalist, the focus of legal reform is to
strengthen each constituent element of the legal system, while ensuring their
harmonious integration into a unified structure. For the purposes of this
Article, I do not seek to identify each component of a functioning legal
system. Instead, I focus on five broad categories of reform, each of which
seeks to strengthen one discrete aspect of the Chinese legal regime.38 These
note 34, at 8-9 (listing five criteria); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. Rlv. 953, 968
(1995) (listing seven criteria); see also Robert S. Summers, How Law Is Formal and Why It Matters, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 1165, 1183-201 (1997) (discussing the formal elements of a modem legal system).
36. See Summers, supra note 35, at 1183-84.
37. See id. at 1184.
38. For an alternate categorization of reform, see Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 95, 99-100 (categorizing reforms by depth and dividing reform into
three categories).
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five categories serve as the criteria against which I analyze an NGO's
contribution to Chinese legal reform.
1. Legislation
The first category of reform centers around the laws themselves. Such
reform involves enacting new legislation, revising existing laws, and repealing
antiquated provisions so as to align the nation's legal code with its needs and
values. The focus of such reform is substantive, normative, and instrumental,
with the challenge for the legislature being (1) to understand accurately the
problems to be corrected through legislation, (2) to decide correctly the policy
goals such legislation shall advance, and (3) to devise, ex ante, laws that can
correct such problems or advance such goals effectively. The primary
difficulties presented by this first category of reform concern the legislative
process itself: How do we ensure that the legislature receives the information
it needs to make sound decisions? How do we prevent powerful individuals or
interest groups from capturing the legislative process for their own ends? How
do we ensure that the legislature, when deciding on what best advances the
national interest, has first heard from all relevant parties? How do we endow
the legislature with the ability to craft laws that can accomplish their purpose?
Resolution of these difficulties partially requires establishing mechanisms for
legislators to acquire or access the substantive expertise that will enable them
to make good law.
2. Legal Institutions
The second category of reform is institutional. This category of reform
seeks to strengthen the legal institutions that administer, enforce, and
implement a nation's laws. Such institutions include formal government
entities, such as the legislature, the courts, the procuracy, administrative
agencies, and law-enforcement organs. They also include informal institutions
involved in legal activity, such as an organized bar, centers for legal
education, and private forums for dispute resolution. The issues implicated by
the reform of legal institutions are highly complex because of the complex
nature in which institutions interact. Some institutions, for example, supervise
other institutions even though they individually perform separate functions;
others offer essential peripheral support but play no leading role in legislation
or adjudication; still others exist primarily as alternate or secondary methods
for accessing the legal system. In addition, besides functioning side-by-side
with other institutions, some institutions are integrated vertically, with
different levels of the same institution performing the same general function
but at different levels of jurisdiction or at different points in a process.
Accordingly, the reform of legal institutions involves the initial step of
differentiating institutions according to function, specifying the role each
institution shall play in the legal system, delineating the scope of authority to
be wielded by the institution in fulfilling its role, and establishing a hierarchy
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of authority to ensure that conflicts between institutions can be resolved
through a predictable process. With this structure as a baseline, the operational
task then becomes to design institutions in such a way and to equip them with
sufficient resources so as to permit them to develop both the competency and
the proper incentives for fulfilling their assigned task within the limits of their
allocated authority. Equally necessary is the design of mechanisms to
minimize divergence in the interpretation, enforcement, and application of the
same substantive law by different institutions.
3. Human Resources
The third category of reform focuses on human resources. For legal
institutions to function effectively, they need to be staffed by qualified
personnel. Legal reform in this category focuses on developing four sets of
qualities in legal personnel. The first of these qualities is substantive legal
expertise, namely familiarity with rules, legal doctrines, and interpretative
principles. The second deals with practical legal skills, such as legal
reasoning, legal drafting, and advocacy. The third quality is ethical rectitude,
with the most important expressions of this quality being the will to remain
free from corruption and the commitment to adhere to relevant rules of
conduct. The fourth quality is more vague and in some ways idealistic.
Reform related to this quality involves cultivating a professional ethos in legal
workers. The exact normative content of this ethos depends on the values
underlying the society and its legal system, but the goal remains to internalize
into legal workers a sense of moral responsibility to act in ways that affirm the
rule of law. In other words, reform that is focused on human resources
involves not only staffing legal institutions with qualified experts but also
convincing these experts that they are officers of the law charged with
upholding a legal regime rather than simply highly skilled laborers who sell
their services for compensation. Some commentators also assert that the
development of the rule of law necessitates the' development of an
independent bar.
39
39. See, e.g., GEOFFERY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 36-37 (1988) (arguing that an independent bar is important to "keep[ing]
the rule of law alive"); Adama Dieng, Role of Judges and Lawyers in Defending the Rule of Law, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 550, 551 (1997) (asserting that the "experiences of many generations ofjurists from
highly diverse nationalities" show that the rule of law requires an independent bar); John McDermott,
The "Rule of Law" in Hong Kong After 1997, 19 LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 263, 268 (1997)
(arguing that preserving the rule of law in Hong Kong after its return to Chinese sovereignty requires
maintaining "an independent judiciary and bar"); cf. Bennett H. Brunmmer, Independent, Professional
Judgment: The Essence of Freedom, 10 ST. THOMAs L. REv. 607, 608-09 (1998) (arguing that
independent, professional judgment on the part of attorneys is the "essence of freedom"); Joryn Jenkins,
Lawyer Regulation, FED. LAW., May 1996, at 5 (asserting that an independent bar is essential to the
protection of personal liberty).
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4. Accessibility
The fourth category of reform focuses on improving public access to the
legal system. Such reform acknowledges that economic principles of scarcity
apply to legal resources yet interprets justice as requiring equality in the
distribution of legal resources, even though such equality might not be
required in other contexts. Put in layman's terms, justice should not be only
for the rich; legal protections on paper are meaningless if barriers impede a
citizen's ability to seek such protection. Consequently, issues implicated by
this category of reform include (1) the availability of counsel, (2) the
availability of legal knowledge for those who are unable to secure counsel, (3)
the removal of impediments to the use of courts and other legal organs, and
(4) the availability of informal, private, or alternate forums for resolving legal
disputes. In addition, public accessibility also involves a cognitive dimension.
Assuming that a citizen can fully access a legal system's institutions, we also
must concern ourselves with whether the system exhibits sufficient
transparency for him to understand, prior to becoming entangled in a legal
dispute, his rights, his duties, and the processes to which he will be subject if
such rights or duties are violated. Such public awareness of the law permits
the citizenry to police itself in two ways: It allows citizens to structure their
behavior in advance to conform with the law, and it informs them when others
have broken the law so that they can then seek proper redress.
5. Legal Culture
The last category of reform is the most nebulous because it deals with
social phenomena. It focuses on cultivating a legal culture whereby obedience
to the law becomes largely voluntary instead of coerced and whereby such
obedience represents an affirmation of the legal regime. The questions
presented by such reform are three: (1) How can we inculcate in the public
mind an understanding of the function of law in ordering society? (2) How do
we translate this understanding into a set of legal norms to be obeyed by the
public? (3) How do we create a moral imperative to comply with legal norms
voluntarily? The emphasis on voluntary compliance raises the issue of
whether legal culture is to be found instead of created. For the public to feel
morally obligated to support a legal regime, it must first deem the regime to
be legitimate.4 0 Developing a legal culture thus involves not only convincing
the public of the legitimacy of the legal regime but also perhaps the reverse-
reforming the legal system so that it conforms with what the public perceives
a priori to be necessary, acceptable, and just.
These five categories of legal reform are especially pertinent to the PRC
because they address widespread deficiencies within the Chinese legal system.
40. See Edward J. Epstein, supra note 33, at 20 ("Legal legitimization... only occurs where
law operates as an ideology without the need for coercion."); Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture:
An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545, 1557 (1989) ("Legal culture also includes what people see as
necessary, acceptable or just, and this may be the basis for their support of the legal system.").
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Reforms directed at legal institutions and human resources, for example, strike
directly at the nation's problems with corrupt and incompetent legal
personnel.41 Similarly, legislative reforms can fill substantive gaps in Chinese
law42 and democratize the legislative process, while reforms tailored at
accessibility can prevent the effects of growing wealth disparity within the
PRC from spilling over into the legal arena.43 Finally, reforms tailored toward
developing a legal culture in the PRC are crucial given the Chinese public's
traditional aversion to defining socioeconomic relations in legal terms,44 the
Cultural Revolution's destruction of the legal system during the 1960s and
1970s, 45 and a general crisis of values in Chinese society today.46 This cultural
and historical backdrop means that the development of the rule of law in the
PRC requires more than the establishment of an effective legal apparatus-it
requires the widespread dissemination of legal values within the community.
B. The Definition of the Term "NGO"
To assert that NGOs can play a positive role in advancing legal reform
requires, as a prerequisite matter, the resolution of three definitional questions:
(1) For the purposes of this Article, what is an NGO? (2) What are the
boundaries of the nonprofit sector whose intervention I posit to be necessary?
(3) How should this sector be defined with respect to a communist country,
like the PRC, where the state dominates much of the public sector?
1. The Context of NGO Activity in the PRC
Western definitions of the term "NGO" tend to emphasize the private
roots of social organizations, juxtaposing them against official government
agencies.47 The American definition, in particular, draws heavily on the image
of American nonprofit organizations as privately constituted, privately funded,
independently operated organizations established by individual citizens who
are united by a common vision of the collective good. Such a definition
41. See supra notes 8, 26-27, and accompanying text.
42. One pressing legislative need is the need to amend existing statutes, many of which were
passed several years ago when the PRC largely operated under a command economy, to accommodate
new socioeconomic conditions brought about by market reforms. See Academic Interview A.
43. See Luo, supra note 10, at 21-22.
44. See BRUGGER & REGLAR, supra note 33, at 176-83.
45. See generally id. at 201-05 (describing the status of law during the Cultural Revolution);
LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA 72-76 (1992) (same). For a summary of the destruction
of the legal system in Maoist China and its reestablishment under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, see
generally Cynthia Losure Baraban, Note, Inspiring Global Professionalism: Challenges and
Opportunities for American Lawyers in China, 73 IND. L.J. 1247, 1257-62 (1998).
46. See Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 1995 CHINA Q. 1, 1.
47. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 571-76 (1998).
48. See id. at 577-83. For the purposes of this paper, I use the term "nonprofit organization"
to refer to groups that are organized along lines similar to the American model. I prefer to use the term
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accords a grass-root connotation to the term and envisions a clear delineation
between governmental actors and the nonprofit sector. It also parallels
Western theories of civil society, which tend to portray social organizations as
alternate centers of political Xpower whose presence helps neutralize the danger
of excessive state authority.
On a formal level, scholars of Chinese civil society classify Chinese
organizations into one of four categories. The first category consists of CCP
sponsored "mass organizations" (qunzhong zuzhi), such as the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League. Because these
mass organizations often play an officially sanctioned political role, they
enjoy a higher status within official circles than other organizations. 50 The
second category consists of officially recognized "social organizations"
(shehui tuanti), which are also referred to by the government as "popular
organizations" (minjian tuanti) or "nongovernmental organizations"
(feizhengfu zuzhi).51 These social organizations exist at both national and local
levels and include business groups, professional associations, cultural clubs,
and academic societies.52 They are subject to varying degrees of state control,
and some have been described by scholars as "GONGOs"--government-
organized nongovernmental organizations. 53 The third category consists of
unofficial groups, including lineage associations, groups that do not qualify
for government recognition, and informally organized individuals with similar
social, religious, or intellectual interests.54 Orgaiizations in this category
include what some scholars have termed to be "secondary" (eri) or "tertiary"
(sanji) organizations-groups without independent legal status established as
subdivisions of much larger institutions that do have independent legal
status.55 The fourth and last category consists of organizations that the CCP
believes to pose a threat to its authority. These organizations are actively
monitored by public security forces, and when necessary, suppressed.56
"NGO" when referring to Chinese organizations because the term does not carry the same grass-roots
connotations as "nonprofit organization."
49. See Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 405, 408 (1997) (describing the Lockean tradition of civil society, which held that civil society
was "necessary to keep government accountable to the people"); see generally Andrew S. Levin, Civil
Society & Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 389, 394-400 (1995) (describing the
development of the notion of civil society in the United States and Europe from being synonymous with
the state to being in contradistinction to the state).
The notion of "civil society" derives from Western political theories on the role of intermediary
organizations in a modem state. Civil society theory posits a sphere of free social interaction and
voluntary organization that is separate and independent from the state. The rise of this sphere shifts
power from the state to the citizenry, and thus the sphere functions (1) to limit the power of the state to
threaten the citizenry and (2) to shift it toward liberal democracy. See generally GORDON WHITE ET AL,,
IN SEARCH OF CIVIL SOCIETY: MARKET REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1-6
(1996) (summarizing the notion of civil society).
50. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 49, at 30-36.
51. See id. at 31.
52. See id.
53. Seeid. at31-33.
54. See id. at 33-35.
55. See Academic Interview D.
56. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 49, at 35-37.
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As a practical matter, however, these formal categories only classify
organizations according to their legal status. They do not define the
parameters of the term "NGO." With respect to the PRC, the term "NGO" is
difficult to define because of the state's pervasive role in Chinese society. 7
Scholars of Chinese civil society have described the PRC as a "state-led civil
society" in which the government actively participates in the formation of
social organizations for the purpose of co-opting activist segments of the
population into supporting state policies.58 The Chinese leadership's view
asserts that NGOs are to function as an "intermediary force" between the
government and the public, working in conjunction with and under the
indirect control of government actors, to accomplish goals determined by the
state.59 This view expects NGO development to be led by the government and
the CCP. 60 It envisions NGOs as vehicles for the government to channel
policy down to the local community and for the local community to channel
feedback to the government.61 It neither posits NGOs as loci for opposition
politics nor grants NGOs complete autonomy in their affairs.
Accordingly, independently formed social organizations that operate
autonomously from state oversight-while prevalent in late imperial China-
are relatively new in the PRC. Although recent statistics boast the existence
of approximately 200,000 officially registered NGOs, 63 the independence of
57. See Timothy Brook & B. Michael Frolic, The Ambiguous Challenge of Civil Society, in
CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA 3, 12 (Timothy Brook & B. Michael Frolic eds., 1997) ("The presence of the
state in Chinese society, although reduced from what it was in the Maoist period, is still strong and has
heavy cultural sanction.').
58. See B. Michael Frolic, State-Led Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA, supra note 57,
at 46, 56-60. For a summary of different views on whether civil society exists in the PRC, see generally
Heath B. Chamberlain, Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics?, 1998 CHINA J. 69 (reviewing CIVIL
SOCIETY IN CHINA (Timothy Brook & B. Michael Frolic eds., 1997)). For a short history of Chinese
NGOs during the late imperial era and the early years of the PRC, see generally Xin Chunying & Zhang
Ye, China, in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN AsIA 85, 85-88 (Thomas Silk ed., 1999).
59. See Zhang Ye, Nongovernmental Organizations in China: Present and Future, in ASIAN
PERSPECTIVES: Focus ON CHINA 14, 16 (1997); Questions and Answers, in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: Focus
ON CHINA, supra, 20,24 (remarks ofZhang Ye) ("[NGOs] are expected to be supplementary or partners
of government.").
60. See Questions and Answers, supra note 59, at 24.
61. See Academic Interview D.
62. Compare Timothy Brook, Auto-Organization in Chinese Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY IN
CHINA, supra note 57, at 19, 22-30 (describing organizations formed during late imperial China), and
WHITE ET AL., supra note 49, at 16 (same), with Brook, supra, at 36-37 ("Since taking state power in
1949, the Chinese Communist Party has been successful in stifling auto-organization in Chinese
society .... Until recently, all organizations that existed did so under Party tutelage."), and WHrrE ET
AL., supra note 49, at 21 ("In the post-Liberation period, the CCP either disbanded or repressed pre-
existing forms of social association and established a new institutional system which.., prevented the
operation of social organizations .... "). For a brief history of social organizations in late imperial China
and the early years of the PRC, see generally Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 85-88.
63. See Kathy Chen, Quiet Revolution? Limited Political Reform Is Spreading Across China,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at 1. In addition to these officially registered NGOs, there are
approximately 800,000 unofficial organizations. These unofficial organizations include a broad range of
groups working outside the main structure of the government in social services, education, the arts,
environmental protection, and other areas. See Zhang, supra note 59, at 16-17.
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many of these organizations is questionable. Most were formed with the
government's imprimatur rather than through grass-roots mobilization or
private initiative. Many NGO heads are former government officials, hold
concurrent positions in affiliated government bodies, or are active members of
the CCP. 65 Many groups receive substantial funding from the state66 and some
even report directly to government agencies.67 This close nexus between
government actors and NGOs does not mean that Chinese NGOs are nothing
more than unofficial extensions of the state, but it does raise the specter of
considerable state control over NGO activity.
Conversely, as shown in Part II, some groups active in legal reform do
not possess formal legal status as independent entities. They instead operate as
relatively autonomous divisions of much larger, state-run institutions, of
which public universities are the primary example. Ironically, it is often their
ability to operate under the auspices of an official institution or their close
relations with the government that make it feasible for these groups to
undertake more progressive reforms. Such cover confers legitimacy upon an
organization's activities, both in the eyes of the public and in the eyes of the
Chinese leadership, thereby allowing the organization to muster the financial
and moral support it needs to operate. NGOs that carry a government
mandate as part of their operations are deemed to be accountable both to the
state and to the public at large,69 thereby drawing less suspicion from the
CCP. Ties with the state also equate to access to important government figures
who hold the power to implement the policies advocated by an NGO. Indeed,
according to some scholars, private contact between respected outsiders and
government officials remains one of the most important channels of injecting
outside opinion into state policy.
70
Consequently, to consider NGOs as only those organizations that fit the
classic profile of an American nonprofit organization or that have been
recognized as having independent legal status under Chinese law would be to
64. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 49, at 32 (describing most PRC social organizations as
having been "established under the sponsorship of state institutions").
65. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 12, at 35 (stating that the leadership of the All China Lawyers
Association are mostly "highly placed, recently retired officials'); SBA Interview A (stating that the
chairman of the Shanghai Bar Association is usually a former Ministry of Justice official); see also
WHITE ET AL., supra note 49, at 32 (describing NGOs as "a convenient home" for the government to
send surplus or older personnel); CJS Interview A (same).
66. See, e.g., ALLEN C. CHOATE, LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (PART I1): AN ASSESSMENT
oF UR3AN RESIDENTS COMMITEES AND MUNICIPAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 32 (1998) (stating that
municipal governments often subsidize municipal foundations by providing office space, staff, and
overhead); Alford, supra note 12, at 35 (stating that funding for the All China Lawyers Association
derives largely from a mandatory fee levied by the Ministry of Justice); CASS Law Institute Interview A
(stating that all funding for the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences comes from the
central government); CCA Interview A (stating that most funding for the China Consumer Association
comes from the central government).
67. See, e.g., CASS Law Institute Interview A (describing formal reports submitted by the
Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to the NPC); CCA Interview A (describing
formal reports submitted by the China Consumer Association to relevant government agencies).
68. See Zhang, supra note 59, at 16; Academic Interview D.
69. See Zhang, supra note 59, at 16.
70. See Academic Interview A; CJS Interview A.
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simultaneously overstate and understate the scope of NGO activity in the
PRC. As some observers have commented, there is "virtually no such thing"
as a completely nongovernmental institution in the PRC, "particularly in the
legal field," though there are "numerous people" within Chinese law schools,
judicial training institutes, bar associations, and other social organizations
who are "deeply concerned about human fights and the rule of law.
'71 The
traditional distinction between government and nongovernment is therefore
not helpful. Accordingly, rather than examining the formal boundaries that
separate an organization from the state apparatus, we should instead focus on
the degree to which individuals within an organization can perform
independently the legal reform activities in which they engage.
2. A Structural-Operational Definition of the Term "NGO"
For the purposes of this Article, I define the term "NGO" by adopting
the definition of nonprofit organizations used in Lester A. Salamon's and
Helmut K. Anheier's comparative study of the nonprofit sector in twelve
countries. In articulating their criteria for nonprofit status, Salamon and
Anheier relied on seven features that they found to be common in the
organizations they studied-commonalties that surfaced notwithstanding
differences in the regulatory framework, historical milieu, social structure, and
demographic composition surrounding these organizations:
72
(1) The organization must be formally constituted in some
institutional sense instead of being an ad hoc gathering of
people.
(2) The organization must be private in the sense of being
institutionally separate from the government, even though the
organization might nevertheless remain subject to
government oversight, be formally part of the state apparatus,
or be governed by a board of directors dominated by
government officials.
(3) The organization must operate on a not-for-profit basis,
meaning that the organization may engage in profit
generating activities but may not distribute these profits to its
directors or owners.
71. Beyond Linkage and Engagement: A New Approach to US China Policy (visited Feb. 2,
1999) <http://www.lchr.org/hongkong/chinapol98.htm>.
72. See Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, The Emerging Sector: The Nonprofit Sector
in Comparative Perspective-An Overview, in DIMENSIONS OF THE VOLUNTARY SEcTOR 71, 72-73
(Susan Saxon-Harold ed., 1995).
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(4) The organization must be able to control its own activities to
some extent and should have internal procedures for
governance.
(5) The organization must not be primarily involved in the
promotion of religious worship or religious education.
(6) The organization must not be constituted primarily to
promote certain candidates for elected office. The
organization, however, may engage in advocacy activity to
change government policy.
(7) Participation in the organization must be voluntary in some
meaningful degree.
These seven criteria create a "structural-operational" definition of the
term "NGO.' '73 Under their boundaries, and for the purposes of this Article, an
NGO is any (1) formally organized group (2) operating for a purpose other
than private profit, (3) whose activities are effectively controlled by
independently minded parties, (4) regardless of whether the group functions
under the umbrella of a state institution, receives funds from government
sources, engages in projects on behalf of the government, or is in some other
way connected with the state or the CCP. The advantages of this definition are
that it accounts for the blurry line that ostensibly separates private actors from
the Chinese government and that it reorients the inquiry around the crucial
question of whether the organization possesses the potential to engage
meaningfully in activity that is not directed by the government, even if the
activity itself supports state policies.
It is important to note that the independence evaluated herein is
independence of thought combined with the opportunity to influence rather
than freedom from government supervision. As stated before, the state's role
in the PRC is pervasive. 74 The CCP dictates national policy and determines
the purview of permissible sociopolitical activity. It imposes substantive limits
on what an NGO may do.75 It co-opts orgnizations into supporting official
state policies.76 It will not tolerate dissent. 77 But the fact that NGOs may not
73. See id. at 73. Other possible ways of defining the term NGO include the U.N. definition,
which describes an NGO as a nonprofit entity whose activities are determined by the collective will of
its members in response to the needs of the communities with which the NGO cooperates. See UNITED
NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE REVIEW OF
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS; REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/5 (1994). Some scholars have criticized broad definitions of
the term NGO, saying that such a definition would embrace 'just about every kind of group except for
private businesses, revolutionary or terrorist groups, and political parties." P.J. Simmons, Learning To
Live with NGOs, FOREIGN POL., Fall 1998, at 82. Instead they believe NGOs should be characterized in
accordance with their respective goals, membership, funding sources, and other factors. See id.
74. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the limits of NGO activity in the PRC, see infra Part IV.
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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act in derogation of CCP policy does not necessarily reduce them to mere
tools of the state.
The economic reforms undertaken by the PRC over the course of the
past twenty years have decentralized the PRC's sociopolitical structure,
opening the way for increased NGO participation in social governance.
Chinese NGO expert Zhang Ye points to three recent developments that have
infused the nongovernmental sector with new dynamism.78 The first
development began in the 1980s, when the central government, as part of its
policy to move from direct to indirect control over many enterprises, began to
delegate responsibility for certain state functions to quasi-private groups or to
society as a whole.79 This development pluralized interests within society and
led to the formation of numerous, relatively autonomous NGOs.80 The second
development was the erosion of the central government's ability to provide for
certain social welfare needs.81 From the 1970s to the early 1990s, revenues
allocated to social welfare programs dropped from thirty-one percent of
national income to a mere thirteen percent. 82 Increased activity from actors
outside of the government, whether profit-seeking or nonprofit, thus became
necessary to offset the state's retreat from its role as social-service provider.
The third development was the rise of a new generation of Chinese leaders
who believed the rule of law to be a more effective method of governance
than the cult of personality or the reliance on coercive measures that typified
much of past Chinese politics.
8 3
This new emphasis on establishing a legal framework within which
diffuse elements of society can function in an orderly fashion also embodies a
more politically inclusive ideology than previous communist doctrine.
Whereas past theories of socialist legality emphasized the need to suppress
enemies of the proletarian dictatorship, more recent theories have reoriented
the focus on the task of liberating productive forces within society, subject to
the limit that such forces be employed in a manner consistent with socialist
principles. 84 These new theories implicitly acknowledge that private initiative
77. See infra notes 403-408 and accompanying text; see also Michael Laris, Chinese Resumes
Arrests: 10 Detained a Week After Clinton Visit, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at A19 (describing the
PRC as moving toward a "more open, law-based society," but where challenges to CCP authority are
handled harshly).
78. See Zhang, supra note 59, at 14.
79. See Kathy Chen, China's Alternate Voices Grow Louder, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1995, at
A10 ("NGOs ... increasingly are tackling problems the government doesn't have the resources to
handle, and [are] drawing attention to new issues.").
80. See Zhang, supra note 59, at 14.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. For further background on how recent reforms have contributed to the rise of the
Chinese nonprofit sector, see generally Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 88-90.
84. See Chih-Yu Shih, China's Socialist Law Under Reform: The Class Nature Reconsidered,
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 627-34 (1996).
20001
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:363
should be encouraged because private initiative, if properly harnessed and
controlled, can be used to strengthen a socialist state.
In the legal arena, these developments have opened doors for NGOs to
operate in fields that were previously monopolized by state actors.
85
Government officials also have begun to rely heavily on academic think tanks
for substantive expertise in drafting and implementing new laws.86 Although
political constraints still confine the scope of permissible NGO activity to a
narrow range of projects, now more than before, individuals outside of
government hold the opportunity to participate in, influence, and in some
instances initiate legal reform. The questions now raised are "How meaningful
is this opportunity?" and "Toward what end have reform minded individuals
used it?"
II. EIGHT EXAMPLES OF NGO PARTICIPATION IN LEGAL REFORM
This Part presents case studies of eight Chinese organizations to
illustrate ways that NGOs have contributed to the development of the rule of
law in the PRC. Roughly speaking, Chinese NGOs that are active in the legal
arena play four roles with respect to the creation of a stable, effective legal
system.87 The first role is that of legal service provider, especially to
disadvantaged segments of the population. The NGOs profiled in Sections
H.A, II.B, and II.C illustrate this role. The second role is educative, primarily
involving the transmission of legal knowledge to the public or the inculcation
of legal values. Most of the NGOs discussed herein perform this role to some
extent, though the organizations profiled in Sections H.B, I.C, and II.G
provide the most direct examples. The third role is regulatory, whereby the
NGO assists the government in regulating certain market activities or in
enforcing the nation's laws. The NGOs profiled in Sections II.D and II.G, and
to an indirect extent the NGOs profiled in Sections II.A and II.B, serve as
examples of NGOs performing this role. The last role is advisory and
potentially activist, implicating the ability of NGOs to influence government
policy. The NGOs profiled in Sections H.B., .E, and I.F illustrate the
different ways in which NGOs can exercise this role.
In evaluating these case studies, the reader should be aware of the
methodological limitations of this Article. Most of the information presented
in Part H came from interviews with individuals active in the profiled NGOs,
whose views necessarily reflect their biases. Their comments also might
reflect what they believe they are allowed to disclose to a foreign researcher,
rather than their true views of the situation. Compounding these problems
were difficulties with obtaining independent confirmation of the information
85. One example is the provision of legal services to the poor. See infra Sections II.A, II.B,
II.C. Another more limited example is the delegation by some local justice bureaus of some of their
regulatory duties to local bar associations. See infra Section II.D.
86. See Academic Interview A; Academic Interview B; see also infra Sections II.E, II.F
(providing examples of cooperation between the government and legal scholars).
87. The four roles described here are not exclusive but are derived only from the eight NGOs
profiled herein.
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my sources provided. To the extent possible, I sought to interview multiple
sources for each NGO, but the reluctance of potential interviewees to speak to
me and the logistical difficulties I encountered when conducting my research
also meant that in some cases, I was able to speak with only one person.
Moreover, to the extent that I rely on written materials published by the NGO,
the reader should be aware that the promotional nature of some of these
materials again cast doubt on their objectivity. These caveats should not be
construed as a disclaimer of the veracity of the information presented in Part
II. I have included only information that appeared credible. But the reliability
of this information is constrained by an unfortunate reality: It is hard to get
good information on politically sensitive topics in the PRC.
A. Legal Services: The Wuhan University Center for the Protection of
Rights ofDisadvantaged Citizens
According to Western nonprofit theory, NGOs play an important role in
the delivery of essential social services to the public.8 In particular, NGOs
often serve segments of the population that for-profit actors refuse to serve for
lack of sufficient financial incentives.89 In this sense, NGOs resemble public
institutions-and in many cases supplement government efforts-in
addressing a social need without regard to the profitability of the activity. So
long as an NGO can secure sufficient funding for its operations, it can serve
those who are unable to compensate it fully for the benefits they receive. From
a macroeconomic perspective, NGOs in the role of service provider thus
implicitly perform a distributive role, enhancing vertical equity by
redistributing resources to segments of the population that otherwise would
not been able to afford certain services on their own.
Among the legal problems confronting the PRC today is the need to
improve ordinary citizens' access to legal resources. The proliferation of
legislation in recent years, 9" the institution of new protections for substantive
rights, 91 and the rise of new forms of economic interaction 92 have expanded
greatly the impact of law on the common Chinese citizen. Yet the vindication
of rights through legal channels remains underdeveloped for much of the
population because of the prohibitive cost of hiring private counsel. 93 This
first case study profiles Wuhan University's Center for the Protection of
Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens (Shehui Ruozhe Quanli Baohu Zhongxin)
88. See Kirsten A. Gronbjerg, Markets, Politics, and Charity: Nonprofits in the Political
Economy, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 137, 138-40 (Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S.
Clemens eds., 1998).
89. See id. at 139.
90. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text
91. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
92. See Luo, supra note 10, at 12; Lubman, supra note 46, at 3.
93. See Luo, supra note 10, at 15-16. Most cases in the PRC are litigated without the aid of
counsel. See Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1523, 1536 (1998).
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(Wuhan Center) to examine the role of Chinese NGOs in providing legal
services to the public.
1. Legal Aid and the Wuhan Center
The Wuhan Center occupies a historic spot in the development of legal
aid in the PRC. Established in May 1992 by a Yale-educated Wuhan
University law professor, it was the nation's first non-government-organized• 4
legal aid center. Since its inception, the Wuhan Center has been the subject
of much positive media coverage.95 In 1994, its activities inspired Xiao Yang,
then Minister of Justice and now President of the Supreme People's Court, to
propose that the government establish its own legal-aid system.96 The Wuhan
Center also has been an inspirational model for other university-based legal
aid centers in the PRC.
97
Staffed by attorneys, faculty members, and student volunteers, 98 the
Wuhan Center provides two types of legal services: It answers in-person,
telephone, and written inquiries for legal advice, and it represents indigent
clients in civil litigation.99 Internally, the Wuhan Center is organized
according to practice area, with separate departments for juvenile law,
women's rights, administrative litigation cases, disability law, and elderly
rights. 00 Each department is headed by a full-time attorney, and the vice
directors of each department are drawn from Wuhan University's law
faculty.' ' Approximately thirty undergraduate students and fifteen graduate
students volunteer their time at the Wuhan Center.1 2 Unlike legal aid centers
that require clients to meet income-based eligibility requirements, the Wuhan
Center accepts cases based on their merits.' 0 It does not see itself as a legal
aid center for the poor but rather as a provider of legal services to
disadvantaged citizens nationwide. 104
94. See BROCHURE OF THE CENTER FOR PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF DISADVANTAGED CITIZENS
(1998). For a brief history of the founding of the Wuhan Center, see generally Yang Chengming,
Zhongguo Shoujia Shehui Ruozhe Quanli Baohu Zhongxin Jishi [,4 Record of China's First Centerfor
the Protection ofthe Rights of Society's Disadvantaged], in SHEHUI RUOZHE QUANLI LUN [WRITINGS ON
THE RIGHTS OF SOCIM'mS DISADVANTAGED] 190, 190-93 (Wan Exiang ed., 1995).
95. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 30; Shi Lihong, LegalAid Office Helps Needy, CHINA DAILY,
Oct. 24, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11203896; see also Yang, supra note 94, at 191 (describing
newspaper coverage of the Wuhan Center).
96. See Huang, supra note 30.
97. See Wuhan Center Interview A; infra note 188 and accompanying text (citing the Wuhan
Center as an inspiration for the establishment of a student legal aid center at the East China University
for Politics & Law).
98. See Mao Qingguo, Guofa Weish Zhong de Zhiyuanzhe [Volunteers Defending the Nation's
Law], SHIDAI BAOGAO [TIMES REPORT], n.d., at 4.
99. The Wuhan Center does not handle criminal matters. See Letter from Martin Wu, Center
for the Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens, Wuhan University, to Emily N. Johnson, Yale
Law School (Dec. 11, 1998) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Wu Letter].
100. See Wuhan Center Interview A.
101. See Wu Letter, supra note 99.
102. See id.
103. See Wuhan Center Interview A; Liebman, supra note 30, at 57-60.
104. See Wuhan Center Interview A.
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In its first six years of operation, the Wuhan Center fielded over 8000
written inquiries, handled over 7700 in-person inquiries, and represented
clients in 340 cases. 105 Currently, it expects to litigate 120 cases per year.
10 6
Although most clients seek the Wuhan Center's assistance on their own, some
are referred there by the local government-run legal aid clinic and by local
courts. 10 7 Among the most notable cases the Wuhan Center has litigated and
won in recent years were a negligence suit on behalf of a four-year-old boy
against local electrical power authorities for injuries sustained from an
exposed electrical transformer;'08 an administrative litigation suit on behalf of
a factory worker against a Hangzhou area Public Security Bureau for illegal
detention;109 and a civil suit on behalf of a sixteen-year-old boy against his
physically abusive father.
110
2. Reasons Behind the Wuhan Center's Success
On a general level, the value of the Wuhan Center as a service provider
is obvious. Insofar as people in the Wuhan area need but are unable to afford
legal services, and to the extent that the government itself is unable to fill this
need, the Wuhan Center helps ensure that they have access to legal counsel.
The Wuhan Center's function, however, takes on added importance
when evaluated in light of its independence from the state. According to one
study of the Wuhan Center's activities, this independence permits the Wuhan
Center to tackle cases that state-run legal aid centers or private attorneys often
avoid."' Among these cases are administrative litigation cases against public
security organs and government officials for rights violations." 2 As a matter
of policy, state-organized legal aid clinics do not handle administrative
105. See Liebman, supra note 30, at 40-41.
106. See Wu Letter, supra note 99.
107. See id.
108. See Mao Qingguo, Wei Ruozhe Qiu Gongdao [Seeking Justice for the Disadvantaged], in
WRITINGS ON THE RIGHTS OF SOCIETY'S DISADVANTAGED, supra note 95, at 187, 189.
109. See Zhou Jialu, Weile Shehui Ruozhe de Quanli: Jt Wuhan Daxue Shehui Ruozhe Quanli
Baohu Zhongxin [On Behalf of the Rights of Society's Disadvantaged: An Account of Wuhan
University's Center for the Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens], in WRITINGS ON THE
RIGHTS OF SOCIETY'S DISADVANTAGED, supra note 95, at 184, 184-85.
110. See id. at 184 (describing newspaper coverage of the Wuhan Center).
111. See LUO, supra note 10, at 32. While the number of Chinese attorneys has increased
dramatically in recent years, the number of criminal cases and administrative cases they handle has
decreased. See id. at 17. One survey also indicates that while "lawyers generally appreciate indigent
criminal defendants' need for defense counsel and for free legal consultation for other indigent clients,
... they are less ardent in representing the indigent in civil and administrative cases." Id. at 46-47; see
also STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 ("Defendants have frequently
found it difficult to find an attorney willing to handle sensitive political cases.").
112. See Luo, supra note 10, at 16. For a general background on administrative litigation in the
PRC, see generally Pitman B. Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial Review
and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 16, at 270
(explaining the Administrative Litigation Law (1991)); infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
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litigation cases.113 Private attorneys are reluctant to take administrative
litigation cases because they are difficult to litigate, do not pay well, and
involve conflict with state agencies. 114 The Wuhan Center's willingness to
litigate against the government thus suggests that legal aid NGOs can play an
important role in helping citizens obtain legal redress for official misconduct.
A more difficult question to answer is whether the Wuhan Center's
success can be replicated by other NGOs. In terms of cases handled,
prominence, and organizational stability, the Wuhan Center is one of the most
successful law-oriented NGOs in the PRC. Four reasons account for this
success. First, the Wuhan Center enjoys the support of the local
government.115 The close ties of its founder and former director, Professor
Wan Exiang, with local government officials facilitates the Wuhan Center's
interactions with state organs.1 6 Second, the Wuhan Center enjoys the support
of Wuhan University, whose faculty members are more intimately integrated
into the Wuhan Center's activities than the faculty members of other law
schools are at their respective university-based legal aid centers.117 Such
faculty involvement helps draw Wuhan University's top law students into the
Wuhan Center and ensures better supervision of student volunteers.1 1 8 Third,
the Wuhan Center is relatively well-funded when compared to other NGOs.
Although the Wuhan Center still relies on the Ford Foundation for
approximately seventy percent of its funds, it has succeeded in finding new
revenue sources-something that other Chinese NGOs often have trouble
doing.119 Last, the Wuhan Center maintains good relations with the Chinese
media, and positive press coverage has enhanced the Wuhan Center's
credibility nationwide.12
0
B. High Profile Litigation: The Beling University Law Department's
Centre for Women 's Law Studies and Legal Services
One defining feature of the U.S. nonprofit sector is the presence of
activist organizations dedicated to advancing a particular agenda. Tactics used
by such organizations to promote their agenda include sponsoring research on
relevant issues, promoting public awareness through media campaigns, and
mounting court challenges against laws with which they disagree. Famous
examples from the United States of the use of litigation to shape the law
include the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
victory in Brown v. Board of Education,121 Planned Parenthood's victory in
Roe v. Wade, 2 2 and the American Civil Liberties Union's victory in Texas v.
113. See Wuhan Center Interview A.
114. See id.
115. See Liebman, supra note 30, at 42.
116. Seeid.
117. See Academic Interview D; Wuhan Center Interview A.
118. See Wuhan Center Interview A.
119. See Academic Interview D.
120. See Wuhan Center Interview A.
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring segregation to be unconstitutional).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring certain laws against abortion to be unconstitutional).
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Johnson.123 These examples show the power of NGOs to reshape substantive
law-at least in a country such as the United States.
Although court challenges of the type mounted by U.S. organizations
against U.S. laws are impossible under the Chinese legal regime, 124 at least
one Chinese NGO has adopted a strategy of engaging in high profile litigation
to advance women's rights. This second case study profiles the Beijing
University Law Department's Centre for Women's Law Studies & Legal
Services (Bejing Daxue Falii Xuexi Funii Falii Yanjiu yu Fuwu Zhongxin)
(BWC) to examine the parameters of NGO legal activism in the PRC.
1. Summary of the BWC's Activities
The BWC was founded in late 1995 under the auspices of Beijing
University's prestigious law department. 125 The impetus for its creation arose
from the extensive attention placed on women's issues when the Fourth World
Women's Conference convened in Beijing in early 1995.126 Since 1997, the
BWC has sought to define for itself a dual role in protecting women's rights.
On the one hand, it has operated as a traditional legal aid center, manning
telephone hotlines, responding to written correspondence, and establishing a
walk-in office where women in need of legal assistance can direct their
inquiries.1 27 On the other hand, it has sought to establish itself as an advocate
for women's rights, using its research arm, the media, and the courts to target
specific types of legal problems that commonly affect Chinese women.
128
In its role as legal aid clinic, the BWC has been widely consulted, and its
activities resemble those of other legal aid organizations.1 29 Between January
1996 and October 1997, the BWC handled over 3000 inquiries from
throughout the PRC.1 30 The subject matter of these inquiries covered a broad
spectrum of legal problems, some of which had direct gender implications,
including cases of sexual harassment, rape, domestic violence, and gender-
123. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (declaring a law against flag desecration to be unconstitutional).
124. Such challenges are impossible in the PRC because Chinese judges do not possess the
authority to strike down laws or regulations as unconstitutional, in contravention of existing law, or
against public policy. For a more thorough discussion on the limits of impact litigation in the PRC, see
infra Subsections II.B.2 and I.B.3.
125. See THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S LAW STUDIES & LEGAL SERVICES 2 (1998).
126. See id. at 10; Guo Jianmei, Yixiang Jiannan er You Yiyi de Shiye-Beida Funai Fal
Yanjiu yu Fuwu Zhongxin Gongzuo Huigu yu Zhanwang [A Difficult but Meaningful Undertaking-A
Look Back and a Look Forward to the Work of the Women's Law Studies & Legal Services Center of
Being University], in 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S LAW STUDIES & LEGAL
SERVICES 12, 12 (1998).
127. See Academic Interview D.
128. See BWC Interview A.
129. Compare Section ll.B, with Section Ml.A, and Section II.C.
130. See Yang Xijuan, Zixun Gongzuo Baogao [A Report on Legal Consultation Work], in
1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S LAW STUDIES & LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 126,
at 29.
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based employment discrimination. 131 Other inquiries handled by the BWC
concerned facially neutral problems that for various social reasons impact
Chinese women disproportionately or place them at a disadvantage vis-A-vis
men.1 32 Among these issues are certain types of labor disputes, divorce cases,
child custody disputes, and the division of assets after divorce. Still other
inquiries fielded by the BWC have no gender component beyond the fact that
the client is female. These cases run the gamut from traffic accidents, to
contract disputes, to medical malpractice, to landlord-tenant conflicts, to
administrative litigation against the government. 133 Of the inquiries received
by the BWC, the majority involve marital disputes. 134 All legal advice is
provided free of charge. 135 Inquiries are catalogued in order to ascertain which
types of problems are most endemic.
136
In its role as advocate, the BWC engages in three types of activities
besides litigation. First, it sponsors academic symposia on women's issues,
conducts relevant research, and submits its findings to the government
through unofficial channels. 13 7 The purpose of such academic efforts is to
increase government sensitivity to women's issues and to urge tacitly for legal
reforms that better safeguard women's rights. 138 Internal sources indicate that
the central government has warnly received a number of the BWC's
reports, 139 although it is impossible to trace any report to any concrete
instance of legal reform. Second, the BWC relies heavily on the media to
publicize women's issues. 140 This use of media resources serves the dual
purpose of attracting public attention to women's issues-with the hope that
such attention will lead to social pressure for reform-and educating women
about their legal rights and about the avenues available for vindicating these
rights when they are violated. Third, the BWC plays a role similar to that of
academic research centers in advising the government on proposed
legislation. 141 Although opportunities to advise the government directly are
infrequent, Beijing University professors affiliated with the BWC have
assisted the government in drafting the proposed Marriage & Family Law and
other legislation. 142
131. See id.
132. See BWC Interview A.
133. See Yang, supra note 130, at 29.
134. See id.; BWC Interview B.
135. See BWC Interview A.
136. See id.
137. See id. One such channel is the All China Women's Association (ACWA), one of eight
mass organizations established by the CCP soon after the founding of the PRC. Because the ACWA
enjoys close ties with the central government and is charged by the government with representing the
interests ofwomen during the government's political discussions, cooperation between the BWC and the
ACWA grants the BWC indirect access to the ears of Chinese leaders. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.; BWC Interview B.
140. See BWC Interview A.
141. For a discussion of the role of academic research centers in advising the government on
legal issues, see infra Sections ll.E, II.F.
142. See BWC Interview A.
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2. The Strategy of Using Litigation To Reshape Chinese Law
The most prominent feature that distinguishes the BWC from other legal
aid centers is its litigation policy. Whereas most other legal aid organizations
function as general legal service providers, litigating cases as part of regular
services, the BWC is much more selective. According to one BWC staff
attorney, the BWC eschews "normal cases" for "complicated, representative
cases" that are likely to produce an impact beyond the vindication of a
particular client's legal rights. 143 The focus is as much on the potential for
advancing an agenda as it is on assisting a particular client in resolving her
legal problems. This selectivity also means that the BWC handles only a
limited number of cases each year, with the target number being
approximately forty.
144
The broader impact the BWC attempts to achieve varies depending on
the case being litigated. Sometimes the goal is to encourage lower-level
government organs to reform their methods for implementing national laws.
145
Such cases usually involve instances in which the implementing organ failed
to follow legally prescribed procedures for enforcing a specific law or
otherwise acted in derogation of central government policy 4 Other types of
cases involve multiple plaintiffs, where the aim is to obtain legal redress for
multiple harms arising from a single defendant's behavior.147 Still other types
of cases involve litigating common but severe violations of law, with the hope
that the threat of litigation itself or media attention drawn to the case will deter
future violations. 148 Many cases litigated by the BWC involve new types of
legal claims, ask defendants to bear legal responsibility for infringements that
in the past have been ignored, or seek to convince judges to interpret
substantive protections broadly. 149 Others simply seek to enforce existing
regulations. 1" Often litigation is coordinated with extensive media coverage
143. Id.; see also A CAUSE OF FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE-RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS
OF THE WORK MADE BY THE CENTER FOR WOMEN'S LAW STUDIES AND LEGAL SERVICES OF PEKING
UNIVERSITY 3 (1998) [hereinafter CAUSE OF FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE] ("[T]he prime task... [for
the BWC] should be handling the cases representative of age-old flaws in the existing system or newly-
rising social problems. By handling and studying these cases, the [BWC] may find solutions for the
problems thus appealing to and lobbying government for a change.').
BWC internal regulations establish three criteria for accepting cases: (I) The client must be
financially needy. (2) The case must involve a legal problem commonly encountered by women. (3) The
infringement of the client's rights must be severe. See Shouli Falii Yuanzhu Anjian Guise [Regulations
on Accepting Requests for Legal Services], in 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S
LAW STUDIES & LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 126, at 9. In addition to these criteria, BWC attorneys
evaluate (1) the sufficiency of evidence, (2) the probability of success, and (3) whether they are already
overburdened by their existing caseload. See BWC Interview A.
144. See BWC Interview B.
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of the issue, and the details of many cases are later compiled into reports for
dissemination as examples of recurring legal problems to which the
government should pay closer attention.
151
Among the most notable cases litigated by the BWC were claims against
a state-owned enterprise for terminating an employee in violation of labor
regulations; 152 against local police officers for the false arrest of three women
on trumped-up prostitution charges;153 against a Beijing factory for failing to
pay eighty of its employees; 15  against township government officials for
incorrectly implementing the nation's family planning policy;155 against a
high school principal for the rape of a female student;"' and on behalf of a
single mother over the right to occupy the family apartment after her
divorce. 157
3. Obstacles to the Use ofLitigation as a Force for Legal Change
To date, the BWC's strategy of using high profile litigation to encourage
legal reform has met with only limited success. Of the sixty cases accepted by
the BWC in 1997, only seventeen were concluded by the end of the year.
158
Although the BWC prevailed in twelve of these seventeen cases, 159 the
effectiveness of its litigation strategy cannot be measured by the number of
times it wins in court. Court victories do not necessarily translate into broad
legal change or even result in adequate legal redress for the client. Many160
verdicts are faulty or provide only token relief. Defendants often ignore
adverse verdicts, especially when the courts cannot monitor enforcement
effectively. 61 Like all litigants, the BWC is often a victim of deficiencies
endemic in the Chinese judicial system. 62 While the problems created bythese deficiencies are not unique to the BWC's cases, they often fuse with
151. See id.
152. See STUDY REPORT ON THE CASES HANDLED BY THE CENTER FOR wOMEN'S LAW STUDIES
AND LEGAL SERVICES OF PEKING UNIVERSITY 5-6 (1997) [hereinafter BWC CASE REPORT].
153. See BWC Interview B.
154. See BWC CASE REPORT, supra note 152, at 6-8.
155. See BWC Interview A.
156. See id.
157. See Liu Donghua, Zhaomou Lihunhou Hechu Anju? [After Divorce Where Should Ms.
Zhao Live?], in 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CENTRE FOR WOMEN'S LAW STUDIES & LEGAL SERVICES,
supra note 126, at 129-30.
158. See BWC CASE REPORT, supra note 152, at 14.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See BWC Interview A. Ideologically speaking, the Chinese judiciary is reluctant to use
coercive measures to enforce judgments because civil judgments are considered to be "contradictions
among the people" instead of between "the enemy and the people." See BUSINESS REGULATION, supra
note 22, at 2-225. In addition, verdicts involving the award of monetary damages are often difficult to
enforce because the defendant lacks assets with which to compensate the plaintiff. Still damage awards,
as a practical matter, are easier to enforce then verdicts involving specific performance. See BWC
Interview A.
162. See BWC CASE REPORT, supra note 152, at 14 ("[T]he prime reason why most of the
cases could not be correctly and fairly handled lies in the current judicial system itself, which is
operating unchecked and sometimes staffed by irresponsible and corrupted judges."). For examples of
such deficiencies, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
Legal Reform in China
traditional views on the role of women in Chinese society, leading some
judges to interpret applicable regulations in ways that perpetuate
discrimination.
163
Compounding the difficulty in using impact litigation as a mechanism
for legal change is the limited range of available remedies. Chinese judges
enjoy little discretion in fashioning proactive remedies. They can only award
damages, order specific enforcement of a contract, or reinstate wrongly
terminated workers. 164 In cases brought under the Administrative Litigation
Act (1991), for example, the judge may only rule a specific action to be
illegal. 165 He lacks the authority to invalidate an administrative agency's
policies, to force the agency to rewrite its procedures, or to prevent the agency
from continuing with the contested practices in other instances. 16  The
decision holds no precedential value, and as a matter of law, it is binding only
on the case at hand. 167 Consequently, the role of litigation in convincing
defendants to reform their practices is largely indirect. Insofar as reform
occurs, it does not arise from court decree; it arises instead as a response to
pressures ancillary to the litigation.
4. The Value ofActivist NGOs in the PRC
Although it is tempting to evaluate the BWC by comparing it to
American NGOs that engage in impact litigation in the United States, such a
comparison helps little in articulating a role for activist NGOs to play in the
Chinese legal arena. If the criterion for success is the ability to instigate courts
to issue broad reaching injunctions or announce landmark, precedential
decisions, then the BWC is a failure. But such cannot be the criterion because
the Chinese legal system is not designed to permit such a role. The value of
the BWC and similar agenda-oriented NGOs instead derives from their ability
to perform three functions.
168
The first of these functions is the prosecution of official and private
malfeasance. According to the BWC's promotional materials, the BWC has
earned a reputation as a "watchdog for social evils,"169 and regardless of its
inability to generate far-reaching change through litigation, its policy of
163. See BWC Interview A.
164. See id.
165. See Administrative Litigation Law arts. 2, 53 (1991) (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http:llwww.
chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/Showframe.egi>; David L. Weller, Note, The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in
China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors To Challenge Agency Action, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1238,
1259-60 (1998); Rosenthal, A Day in Court, supra note 14.
166. See Administrative Litigation Law, art. 12 (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.
chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/Showframe.cgi>; Potter, supra note 112, at 283; Rosenthal, A Day in Court,
supra note 14.
167. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 12, at 8; Rosenthal, A Day in Court, supra note 14.
168. These three functions do not include the provision of legal services to disadvantaged
segments of the community, a role performed by the BWC in its capacity as legal aid center.
169. CAUSE oF FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 143, at 7.
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targeting "representative cases" has drawn much attention to many of the most
common and most severe legal problems facing Chinese women today.
Western nonprofit theory posits some NGOs as the equivalent to quasi-private
attorneys general, and the experiences of the BWC indicate that Chinese
NGOs can play this role. Even if the impact of a court victory is limited to the
case at hand, the verdict at minimum represents a moral victory for the
aggrieved party and many times will provide that party with at least some
level of enforceable redress.
The second function is that of a voice for substantive change in relevant
law. Through its research and litigation activities, the BWC has developed
substantive expertise in the legal issues germane to women's rights in the
PRC. Such expertise, whether presented in the form of case reports to
government authorities or in the form of advice during legislative drafting
sessions, can assist the government greatly in reforming the legal system in
ways that better protect women's rights. Although political constraints restrict
criticism of government policy, advocacy through less public channels
appears to be permissible. BWC's affiliation with Beijing University in
particular gives the BWC a credible voice in official circles.1 0 This ability of
NGOs to serve as a voice for their constituents helps ensure that the interests
of such constituents are represented in the political process.
The third function is that of resource to the public. Among the functions
Western NGOs perform is dissemination of information. 171 The cases handled
by the BWC have been covered extensively by the media, making the BWC
one of the best known NGOs in the PRC. Regardless of the outcome of these
cases, such coverage has increased public awareness of women's legal
problems, of their legal rights, and of possible remedies.
The combination of these three functions gives the BWC an important
role in generating pressure for reform related to women's issues. While it
might not be able to force legal change, it can instruct, urge, and perhaps
motivate those who do hold such power. In other words, despite questions
about the direct impact of BWC litigation, its indirect impact can be
important.
C. Student Volunteerism: Fudan University Students' Legal Aid Clinic and
the Huazheng Students 'Legal Aid Clinic
One trend that has developed within the past three years is the rise of
student-initiated, student-run legal aid centers at a number of Chinese
universities. 172 These clinics differ from the Wuhan Center, the BWC, and
other similar university-based legal aid centers in that these student legal aid
clinics were established neither by faculty members nor pursuant to official
170. See Academic Interview D.
171. See HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS & ASSOCIATIONS 1 (6th ed. 1994).
172. Universities with student-run legal aid centers include Beijing University, East China
University for Politics & Law, Fudan University, Shanghai University, and Zhongnan University.
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efforts on the part of a university. Instead, they were founded by students as
campus organizations and are run exclusively by student volunteers under
minimal faculty supervision. 173 This case study evaluates the experiences of
the Fudan University Students' Legal Aid Center (Fudan Daxue Xuesheng
Fali Yuanzhu Zhongxin) (FUSLAC) and the Students' Legal Aid Center at
the East China University for Politics & Law (Huadong Zhengfa Xueyuan
Falii Yuanzhu Zhongxin) (Huazheng Center)-two of the earliest student-run
legal aid centers. Among the issues raised in this study are (1) the role of
NGOs as vehicles for the self-organization of activist members of society, (2)
the contribution of student-organized, law-oriented groups to legal education,
(3) the autonomy enjoyed by such groups, and (4) obstacles that limit their
efficacy.
1. Introduction to the FUSLAC
The FUSLAC traces its roots to early 1996, when a small group of
students who had been assisting local citizens with their legal problems on an
ad hoc basis decided to establish a formal structure for rendering legal advice
to the Shanghai community. These students obtained permission from Fudan
University and the Shanghai Bureau of Justice to establish a student-run legal
aid center, Fudan University's law department agreed to assign two faculty
members to supervise the students, and the FUSLAC officially entered into
existence. Since 1996, FUSLAC's staff has grown to thirty-two students with
aspirations to expand to about fifty to sixty students.1 74 Students work on a
purely volunteer basis, receiving neither pay nor academic credit for their
work.
175
Formally, the FUSLAC operates under the supervision of the Shanghai
Yangpu District Bureau of Justice and relies on Fudan University's law
department for faculty assistance.176 In reality, however, the students work
autonomously, with almost no oversight from either the government or school
officials. The FUSLAC's by-laws, operating procedures, and internal
regulations were all drafted by students, and students continue to dictate
FUSLAC policy.177 Similarly, students set the criteria for admission into the
FUSLAC, and FUSLAC students themselves interview potential candidates
before deciding on whether to admit them. 178 Students make all decisions
related to the handling of cases.17 9 Even the decision to accept a client's case
is made by students in consultation with one another.180 No faculty permission
173. See Academic Interview C.
174. See generally FUSLAC Interview A (describing the history of the FUSLAC).
175. See id.
176. See By-Laws of the Fudan University Students' Legal Aid Clinic, art. 2.
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is necessary, and neither the school nor the government has imposed any
restrictions on the type of cases the FUSLAC may take 81-though practical
constraints limit such cases to only civil matters. 182 Although school officials
have nominally assigned certain faculty members to assist the FUSLAC, in
practice, faculty members participate in the FUSLAC's operations only to the
extent that students seek out their professors for advice on resolving particular
legal issues.
183
The bulk of the FUSLAC's work consists of answering inquiries from
the Shanghai population. The FUSLAC operates three student-staffed
information stations where local residents may walk in and seek legal
advice. 184 The FUSLAC also receives written inquiries from all over the PRC
and operates a telephone hotline devoted to women's rights. Between June
1997 and March 1998, the FUSLAC received over 1100 in-person and
telephone inquiries and replied to 442 pieces of mail. 185 In addition to giving
legal advice, FUSLAC students sometimes play a more active role in
resolving their client's legal problems by representing them in negotiations
with the opposing side, in mediation, and even in court. 186 The FUSLAC also
works with local elderly associations to provide legal assistance to senior
citizens.
18 7
2. Introduction to the Huazheng Center
Students at the East China University for Politics & Law established the
Huazheng Center in November 1997 after attending a conference at the
Wuhan Center. 88 Like the students who founded the FUSLAC, many of the
Huazheng Center's founders had previously engaged in ad hoc dissemination
of legal advice to the local community and had wanted to establish a formal
vehicle for the provision of legal services to Shanghai residents. 8 9 Although
founded one year after the FUSLAC, the Huazheng Center has grown more
rapidly, partially because it draws upon a larger student body and partially
because of the greater degree of support it enjoys from school officials. 190
Currently, the Huazheng Center operates with a staff of 130, again all student
volunteers who receive no financial remuneration or academic credit for their
181. Seeid.
182. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
183. See FUSLAC Interview A.
184. See INTRODUCTION TO THE FUDAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' LEGAL AID CENTER 15 (1998)
[hereinafter FUSLAC INTRo].
185. See id. at 11. No statistics were available for the in-person and telephone inquiries, but of
the written inquiries, 15% concerned administrative litigation involving alleged government misconduct.
See id. at 13.
186. See FUSLAC Interview A.
187. See Academic Interview C.
188. See Huazheng Interview A.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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work.191 Its goal, according to one student, is to spread legal knowledge to the
community and encourage dispute resolution through legal processes.
192
Like the FUSLAC, the Huazheng Center operates autonomously, with
neither the school nor the government imposing any restrictions on the type of
cases the students may accept and with the students themselves being
responsible for all aspects of the Huazheng Center's operation.193 In contrast
to the FUSLAC, school officials have not assigned any faculty members to
work with the Huazheng Center's students. Faculty are involved in the
Huazheng Center's activities only insofar as students can persuade faculty
members to answer their questions on substantive legal matters. 194 Huazheng
Center students also rely on an informal network of local lawyers for help.
195
As with the FUSLAC, the bulk of the Huazheng Center's work consists
of answering inquiries for legal advice, supplemented by representation of
indigent clients in mediation, negotiations, and civil litigation. Inquiries come
through letters and in-person visits to the office. 196 The Huazheng Center also
hosts a weekly radio show during which listeners can call in with their legal
questions. 197 In addition to these more traditional legal aid activities, the
Huazheng Center also has a division dedicated to conducting surveys, which
does, on average, one survey per semester to gauge the public's understanding
of everyday legal issues. 198 During its first year of operation, the Huazheng
Center fielded over 2000 inquiries. 99 In May 1998, for the first time since its
inception, students from the Huazheng Center argued in court on behalf of a
client, winning the case at the trial level; they argued again in November 1998
to win the appeal. 200 Among the topics covered by the surveys that the
Huazheng Center has conducted are family law, the rights of the elderly, and
public reaction to certain pieces of proposed legislation.21 Like the FUSLAC,
the Huazheng Center also works with local elderly associations to provide
202legal aid to senior citizens.
191. See id.
192. See Huazheng Interview D.
193. See Huazheng Interview A.
194. See id.
195. See Academic Interview C.
196. See FAYUAN ZHI CHUANG [WINDOW INTO LEGAL AID] 3-5 (1998) [hereinafter WINDOW
INTO LEGAL AID]; Huazheng Interview B.
197. See WINDOW INTO LEGAL AID, supra note 196, at 3-5; Huazheng Interview B.
198. See Huazheng Interview A.
199. See WINDOW INTO LEGAL AID, supra note 196, at 6.
200. See Huazheng Interview A. For a summary of the case, see WINDOW INTO LEGAL AID,
supra note 196, at 10-12.
201. See Huazheng Interview A.
202. See Academic Interview C.
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3. The Efficacy of Student Legal Aid
The contribution of student legal aid centers in improving public access
to legal services is difficult to measure. Although it is easy to quantify the
number of inquiries fielded, it is hard to gauge the quality of the service
provided. Due to the volume of inquiries, follow-up contact with clients after
their inquiries have been answered is virtually nonexistent, and thus the extent
to which clients follow a center's advice, the extent to which opposing parties
pay heed to its opinion, and the extent to which its involvement ultimately
203results in a satisfactory resolution for the client are unknown. According to
one student's estimate, the FUSLAC is effective in only about thirty percent
of the inquiries it receives. 20 4 Fifty percent of inquiries are deemed to be
inherently unsolvable because they present problems unsuitable for legal
resolution, because the client has exhausted all appropriate legal avenues, or
because the client simply has no valid case.20 5 FUSLAC is unable to render
assistance in the remaining twenty percent because it lacks necessary
expertise.
206
Despite student confidence in the accuracy of the advice given,20 7 the
unsupervised nature of the students' provision of legal aid raises serious
concerns about quality. The vast majority of FUSLAC and Huazheng Center
students are undergraduate juniors who have neither interned at law firms nor
received any formal training in either legal advocacy or the substantive legal
issues on which they are advising.2 °8 Older students train new students, and
even then, most training occurs in the form of on-the-job training as opposed
209to a more structured program. Although faculty members assist both
FUSLAC and Huazheng Center students with their cases, such assistance is
far looser than the close supervision found in legal aid clinics at U.S. law
schools. 210 Students consult with faculty only when they encounter a legal
problem that they believe they cannot resolve by themselves. Students
respond to the vast majority of inquiries on their own, though both the
FUSLAC and the Huazheng Center have instituted internal procedures under
which students check each other's work before an answer is given to a
client.
211
Beyond lack of oversight, two other handicaps hamper student-run legal
aid centers. The first of these handicaps stems from inadequate financial
resources. Of the two centers discussed herein, the Huazheng Center enjoys a
far greater degree of financial support from school officials and the
203. See Huazheng Interview B.
204. See FUSLAC Interview A.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. For example, none of the four Huazheng Center students I interviewed expressed any
doubts about their ability to dispense legal advice. See Huazheng Interview A; Huazheng Interview B;
Huazheng Interview C; Huazheng Interview D.
208. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview A; Academic Interview C.
209. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview B.
210. See Academic Interview C.
211. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview D.
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community. Although the East China University of Politics & Law allocates
only limited direct funds to the Huazheng Center, it provides free office space,
telephone service, access to photocopying equipment, and other administrative
necessities. 12 The Huazheng Center also has been able to obtain limited
funding from a local foundation and a one-time grant of RMB$20,000 from a
university alumnus. 3 Yet despite such support, students often subsidize their
own work-for example, by paying for their own transportation expenses.
2 14
The FUSLAC, in contrast, is almost entirely self-funded. Although
Fudan University provides the FUSLAC with office space, the students
themselves bear all of the FUSLAC's operating expenses-including
telephone, postage, and other administrative costs that the Huazheng Center
relies on its sponsoring university to bear.215 The FUSLAC finances its
operations by levying membership dues upon its student volunteers, but
because these dues are far from sufficient to cover operating expenses, most
students finance their own casework-often spending, over the course of one
year, ten times the amount they pay in dues to the FUSLAC.216 The FUSLAC
receives no outside support.217
The second limitation arises from the capacity in which the students
represent their clients. Because they have not passed the national bar exam,
students may represent clients only in their capacity as private agents
appointed by clients to speak on their behalf.218 They are not equivalent to
legal counsel and accordingly may not act with the same authority as
attorneys. Because PRC law permits only attorneys to compel discovery, the
students' lack of attorney status means that they often encounter difficulties
when they attempt to collect evidence to support their cases.219 For this
reason, both the FUSLAC and the Huazheng Center limit their practice to
civil cases, 220 though Huazheng Center students have advised on criminalmatters without formally representing the client.221
212. See Huazheng Interview A.
213. See id.
214. See Huazheng Interview B.
215. See FUSLAC Interview A.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Chinese law permits a party to have another person represent him in court; this person
need not be an attorney. See Civil Procedure Law, arts. 49, 58, 61 (1991) (visited Apr. 19, 2000)
<http:lwww.qis.netlchinalaw/prclaw34.htm>.
219. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview B.
220. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview B. The other reason is that the Criminal
Procedure Law (1996) contains a right-to-counsel provision, which enables the court to supply an
unrepresented criminal defendant with an attorney if he so requests. See China's Legal Assistance for
the Weak, Xinhua Eng. Newswire, July 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11185330 [hereinafter Assistance
for Weak].
221. See Huazheng Interview B.
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4. The Pedagogical Value of Student Legal Aid
The pedagogical value of student-run legal aid centers is also difficult to
measure. On the one hand, students report that their participation in either the
FUSLAC or the Huazheng Center has improved their communication skills,
has trained them to be more skillful in spotting legal issues, and has endowed
them with practical lawyering skills.22 On the other hand, because of the
dearth of faculty supervision, it is unclear whether the technical skills the
students feel they have developed have in fact been developed correctly.223 As
one professor fears, the absence of a formal clinical education structure to
support the students' handling of their cases means that students develop
technical skills in a haphazard fashion, thereby raisin serious questions as to
whether they are picking up bad habits along the way. 24
Notwithstanding doubts about skill development, the ideological impact
of participation appears to be strong. When questioned about their reasons for
volunteering to work in student-run legal aid centers, students articulated a
variety of reasons, ranging from an idealistic desire to serve society,225 to an
intellectual desire to bridge the gap between the academic world's perspective
of legal issues and the public's perspective, 226 to the self-serving desire for
practical experience.227 But regardless of their reasons for joining, all of the
students with whom I met said that their experience with their respective
student legal aid centers has strengthened their commitment to pro bono
work.228 In contrast to their classmates who are not involved with legal aid
centers-whom the students criticize as understanding legal practice largely in
financial terms229 -both FUSLAC and Huazheng Center students describe
themselves as more inclined to see lawyers as ethically obligated to serve
society.23°
Furthermore, both FUSLAC and Huazheng Center students credit their
legal aid work with teaching them the need for taking a more comprehensive
approach toward legal reform. According to these students, most Chinese law
students believe that legal solutions exist for almost all of the PRC's
problems:231 If there is a problem, it is because the legislature has not yet
enacted the right law--or so the common view holds. In contrast, both
FUSLAC and Huazheng Center students assert that reform of legal institutions
and improving the quality of legal personnel are equally paramount to legal
222. See, e.g., FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview A; Huazheng Interview C;
Huazheng Interview D.
223. See Academic Interview C.
224. See id.
225. See Huazheng Interview B; Huazheng Interview D.
226. See Huazheng Interview A.
227. See Huazheng Interview C; Huazheng Interview D.
228. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview A; Huazheng Interview B; Huazheng
Interview C; Huazheng Interview D.
229. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview C.
230. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview A.
231. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview B; Huazheng Interview C.
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reform .2 3 2 They attribute this lesson to their experience in dealing first-hand
with the Chinese legal system.
From this perspective, the pedagogical value of student-run legal aid
centers does not lie in their ability to teach technical skills. According to one
student, students who have not worked in a legal aid center will develop with
equal proficiency after they have entered the working world any technical
competence that FUSLAC and Huazheng Center students acquire as a result
of their legal aid work.233 But without legal aid experience, such students, he
believes, might lack the opportunity to develop a professional ethos that
includes a commitment to public interest work.234 Although no objective data
exists to validate the student's theory, studies conducted within the United
States show that American students who participate in legal aid work during
law school show a greater commitment to public interest work after
graduation, even if such students take careers in private practice.235 If this
trend also applies to the PRC, then despite questions about their efficacy and
pedagogical value, student-run legal aid centers perhaps play an important
role in internalizing within students a sense of the lawyer as a moral actor.
The challenge becomes how to improve the centers' pedagogical value-in
essence, how to turn student legal aid from an unstructured extracurricular
activity into a true clinical education program.
236
Student-run legal aid centers also serve two other values. To the extent
that students are capable of disseminating accurate legal knowledge to the
public or providing quality legal assistance to the poor, such centers harness
the energy of students for a purpose consistent with the rule of law. Because
they are student-run, these organizations give students the opportunity to
practice a form of self-governance. If one of the hallmarks of civil society is
the presence of political space for like-minded individuals to organize
themselves to engage in sociopolitical activity,237 then both the FUSLAC and
the Huazheng Center demonstrate that even the PRC has pockets of such
space.
D. Toward an Independent Bar: The Shanghai Bar Association
Among the issues confronting Chinese NGOs is the tension between an
organization's aspiration for autonomy and its need to ally itself with the
government in order to advance the interests of its constituents. The
experiences of the Shanghai Bar Association (SBA) illustrate this tension. The
232. See FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview B; Huazheng Interview C.
233. See FUSLAC Interview A.
234. See id.
235. See Howard Erlanger et al., Law Students' Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on
an Old Question, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 851, 862 n.23 (1996).
236. See Academic Interview C.
237. See HE BAOGANG, THE DEMOCRATIC IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA 14-16
(1997); WHITE ETAL., supra note 49, at 1-6.
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issues presented in this case study include (1) competition between the SBA
and the Shanghai Bureau of Justice (SBOJ) for regulatory authority over
Shanghai lawyers, (2) the need for SBA-SBOJ cooperation to protect attorney
rights from encroachment by other government actors, and (3) logistical
obstacles to greater autonomy for the SBA. The broader question examined is
the extent to which bar associations can help the PRC develop an independent,
self-regulating bar.
1. The Formal Authority of Chinese Bar Associations
Unlike American bar associations, which serve as the institutions
through which American lawyers exercise self-regulation, Chinese bar
associations were organized to supplement government regulation of the legal
profession. Under the Lawyers Law (1996), the responsibility of bar
associations is limited to (1) organizing continuing legal education, (2)
educating attorneys about their ethical obligations, (3) conducting exchanges
with foreign bar associations, (4) mediating disputes arising from the practice
of law, and (5) other responsibilities imposed by law.238 Actual regulatory
power over the legal profession, such as the power to admit attorneys to the
bar, to approve the formation of law firms, and to discipline wayward
attorneys rests with the Ministry of Justice.23 9 Accordingly, regulatory
authority over the attorneys of a given locality falls under the jurisdiction of
the local Bureau of Justice, although local justice bureaus will often
unofficially delegate some of its regulatory duties to the local bar
association.
240
Like other Chinese bar associations, the SBA is a registered social
organization operating under the umbrella of the All China Lawyers
Association. SBA membership is mandatory for all attorneys in the Shanghai
area,241 and current membership stands at approximately 4000 attorneys.
Every two years, the SBA convenes a general meeting to discuss its
operations, pass plans for the next two years, and nominate panels to handle
important issues. During the general meeting, SBA members also elect a
board of fifty directors to manage its affairs. The board, in turn, elects a
standing committee to handle day-to-day affairs and a chairman to represent
the SBA. On most matters, the SBA acts through panels, each of which is
responsible for a certain issue. Among the most important panels are the
disciplinary panel, which plays a key role in investigating and punishing
ethics violations; the newly-formed law office reform panel, which
encourages the development of private law firms in Shanghai; the external
238. See Lawyers Law, art. 40 (1996) (last modified Apr. 7, 1998) <http:/wW.qis.net/
chinalaw/prclaw58.htm>. Of these responsibilities, the first two are the most important. See ACLA
Interview A.
239. See Lawyers Law, arts. 11, 19,45; ACLA Interview B.
240. See ACLA Interview B.
241. See Lawyers Law, art. 39 ("Lawyers must join the local bar association in the locality in
which their law offices are located. Lawyers who have joined a local bar association will automatically
become ACLA members.").
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communications panel, which coordinates exchange with outside bar
associations; and the continuing education panel, which hosts training
seminars as part of the SBA's efforts to maintain high professional
standards.
242
2. The Context of Cooperation Between the SBA and the SBOJ
Relations between the SBA and the SBOJ can be best characterized as
half aligned and half in conflict. This awkward situation arises from the
tension between the SBA's and the SBOJ's shared interest in protecting
Shanghai attorneys from outside abuse and the desire of many Shanghai
attorneys for the Shanghai bar to remove itself from SBOJ control and become
largely self-regulating.
The SBA's incentive to cooperate with the SBOJ arises from the SBOJ's
status as an official government agency.243 Such status permits the SBOJ to
take actions which the SBA, as an NGO with limited powers, cannot take on
its own. Equally important, such status permits the SBOJ to deal with
government agencies on equal footing. Government actors who threaten
attorney interests cannot overrule or ignore the SBOJ in the same way they
can dismiss the SBA. Implicit in the SBA's cooperation with the SBOJ is its
recognition that it currently lacks the power to protect the interests of its
constituents with the same efficacy as the SBOJ.244
The SBOJ's incentive to cooperate with the SBA, in contrast, arises
from its need to redefine its role in light of recent changes to the legal
landscape. 245 Prior to recent reforms, a key source of SBOJ influence derived
from its power to appoint the directors for state-owned law firms. 2 46 This
power accorded to the SBOJ a direct role in the management of the practice of
law within the Shanghai region. As privatization shifted legal practice from
state-owned law firms to private firms, the SBOJ's ability to exercise direct
control over the legal community diminished. This diminished authority, in
turn, raised the specter that Shanghai attorneys would seek to further reduce
the SBOJ's role within the legal community, favoring instead self-regulation
through the SBA. In response to these changes, the SBOJ recognized that its
legitimacy in the eyes of Shanghai lawyers would depend heavily on its ability
to advance their interests.247 To the extent that the SBOJ could protect
attorneys in ways that the SBA could not, the SBOJ preserved a rationale for
242. See generally SBA Interview A (discussing the SBA's structure).
243. See id.
244. Cf Richard Tomlinson, A Much Criticized Legal System Takes Tentative Steps Toward
Reform, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 25, 1996, at 6 (expressing the chairman of the Beijing Bar
Association's view that independence from the government would decrease the bar association's
influence).
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its leadership of the Shanghai bar. The need to justify its importance to the
legal community thus became the impetus for cooperation with the SBA."
This marriage of convenience between the SBA and the SBOJ has
resulted in increased freedom for local attorneys to defend their clients and
has reduced the threat of retaliation from law-enforcement and prosecutorial
organs. The most prominent recent example involved a 1997 case in which a
Shanghai attorney tested the bounds of zealous advocacy during his defense of
a criminal defendant.249 Upset with the attorney's advocacy, local prosecutors
arrested the attorney in derogation of official procedures, charging him with
250suborning perjury. The arrest provoked an outcry from the legal
community, and under the leadership of Wang Wenzheng, then chairman of
the SBA and reputedly an advocate of attorney rights, members of the SBA
mobilized to defend their colleague.25 1 The SBA sent prominent lawyers to
defend the attorney in court and threatened to sue the Shanghai procuracy for
illegal conduct.252 Concurrently, the SBA's leadership worked behind the
scenes to protest the arrest to vanous government authorities, including the
CCP's internal committee on legal affairs.253
Although the SBOJ, interested in maintaining harmonious relations with
the Shanghai procuracy, was hesitant at first to defend the arrested attorney,
mounting pressure from the legal community led it to join the SBA's
efforts. 254 The SBOJ's involvement, in turn, led the procuracy to open its files
to SBOJ and SBA investigators, who mutually concluded that the attorney's
arrest had been illegal and that the allegation of suborning perjury could not
be substantiated. 5 Six months after the arrest, the Shanghai procuracy, under
pressure from the SBA, the SBOJ, and other government authorities that had
been mobilized by the SBA, withdrew the case on grounds that it had failed to
follow proper procedures when it arrested the attorney. Although many SBA
members played important roles in securing the attorney's release, insiders
believe that they could not have prevailed without the SBOJ's assistance.
2 5 6
Of equal importance to the attorney's release was the Shanghai
procuracy's agreement to new procedures to reduce the threat of prosecutorial
retaliation against zealous attorneys.257 Under an informal understanding
reached between the SBOJ and the Shanghai procuracy, the procuracy agreed
to institute three safeguards. 258 First, it promised to observe strict internal









256. See id. Between 1996 and 1998, the All China Lawyers Association received 59
complaints of attorneys being threatened or harassed by law enforcement officials. See STATE
DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
257. See id.
258. See SBA Interview A.
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would involve the prosecution of an attorney for conduct related to his defense
of a client.259 Second, it agreed to refer all cases against attorneys to the
highest level of its office, thereby effectively removing prosecutorial authority
over attorneys from low-level prosecutors who were believed to be more
likely to abuse their authority, especially against attorneys they had faced in
court.260 Third, it pledged to consult with the SBOJ before initiating any
formal legal action against an attorney.
261
The release of the attorney and the protections accorded by the informal
agreement to Shanghai attorneys illustrate that one role NGOs can play is to
prompt certain government actors to intercede against other government
actors to protect legal rights.
3. Conflict Between the SBA and the SBOJ
Beneath the cooperation between the SBA and the SBOJ, however, lurk
slow but steady efforts on the part of the SBA to expand its independence. In
the eyes of many lawyers, the SBA's reliance on the SBOJ to protect attorney
rights from government encroachment is a double-edged sword.262 It is
effective, but it also reinforces SBOJ control over the Shanghai legal
profession. SBA distrust of the SBOJ is further fueled by the fact that many of
the SBOJ personnel charged to oversee the Shanghai bar are themselves not
lawyers. Although the SBA's push for greater independence is not equivalent
to a demand for complete autonomy, it represents a gradual attempt to relocate
some regulatory power from the government into the hands of the profession
itself.
The primary turf battle between the SBA and the SBOJ centers around
263control over the attorney approval process and over disciplinary oversight.
Under the current relationship between the SBA and the SBOJ, the power to
approve a candidate's admission to the bar and to discipline attorneys who
violate legal ethics codes resides squarely within the hands of the SBOJ. For
the SBOJ, such authority provides a powerful mechanism for maintaining
indirect control over the Shanghai legal community. As part of its support for
a more independent bar, the SBA has advocated transferring responsibility for
attorney certification to the SBA.264 Similarly, the SBA also has pushed for a
greater role in disciplining attorneys, although insiders believe that the SBOJ265
is most reluctant to relinquish this power. In the interest of maintaining
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on whether to censure, suspend, or disbar a wayward attorney. 66 Professional
courtesy between the SBA and the SBOJ ensures that most disciplinary
decisions are made collectively after much discussion and compromise
between the SBOJ and the SBA's disciplinary panel. Yet although there has
been no recent instance of the SBOJ disciplining an attorney over the SBA's
objections, SBA-SBOJ consultations on disciplinary issues occur within a
context in which the SBOJ wields greater influence than the SBA.267
A second area of conflict involves the chairmanship of the SBA.
Although the SBA board formally elects the SBA chairman, in reality, the
person elected has always been the SBOJ's nominee. 68 SBOJ approval of the
SBA chairman is crucial given the SBA's reliance on the SBOJ to act on its
behalf in many important matters. In order for him to be effective, the SBA
chairman must be well connected to the political establishment and must have
strong working ties with the SBOJ. Consequently, former SBOJ heads are
often favored by both the SBOJ and the SBA to serve as chairman. For the
most part, the SBA has expressed little disagreement with past SBOJ
nominees, but occasional conflicts do arise. One such incident occurred in
1998, when the SBA disapproved of the nominee because a number of
Shanghai attorneys believed that he was insufficiently sympathetic to attorney
interests. What happened next is unclear, but some attorneys believe that
behind-the-scenes lobbying by SBA directors led the SBOJ to reconsider its
decision.269 The SBOJ withdrew the nominee from consideration and instead
nominated Zhang Ling, whom the SBA elected to be its chairman. 70 If true,
this incident further supports the theory that the SBOJ is gradually losing
power to the SBA.
4. Other Obstacles to Independence
As suggested above, the primary political obstacles to a truly
independent bar in Shanghai are two: the CCP's de facto prohibition against
truly independent social organizations and the SBA's current inability to
protect attorneys against government misconduct without the aid of the SBOJ.
These two obstacles arise from the inherent structure of the Chinese political
system and will remain so long as NGOs stand at a significant disadvantage
when challenging government authorities.
Other obstacles to a greater role for the SBA, however, are logistical and
are thus more surmountable. The first such obstacle is insufficient manpower.
The dynamic growth of the Shanghai legal practice has led local attorneys to
focus on business development for their own firms, with few attorneys willing
to volunteer time to run bar-initiated projects. 27 1 Among the SBOJ's strongest
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the fact that the SBA lacks the staff to handle this responsibility.272 The
second logistical obstacle involves SBOJ influence over the existing SBA
staff. Currently, the SBA's administrative staff consists solely of SBOJ
employees who have been seconded to the SBA, thereby making staff
members accountable to the SBOJ instead of to the SBA.2 3 Although the
SBA has attempted to hire staff away from the SBOJ, staff members have
rebuffed these attempts, partly due to their unwillingness to give up the status,
benefits, and job security they enjoy as government employees.
274
Despite such obstacles, SBA members remain hopeful. According to one
source, the SBA should be able to expand its influence gradually over the next
three to five years, provided that the Chinese economy continues to grow.
275
The prospect of a self-governing, relatively independent bar within Shanghai
could be realized in as early as ten years.276 The SBOJ, recognizing that its
influence will continue to wane as the Shanghai legal market is further
privatized, appears amenable to a gradual shift of responsibilities to the
SBA-much in the same way that the Beijing Bureau of Justice has delegated
most of the responsibility for attorney certification to the Beijing Bar
Association. 277 As law firms expand and stabilize, private firms will have
more resources to send to the SBA. Such an increase in resources should help
alleviate the SBA's staffing problems, making it logistically possible for the
SBA to take on more responsibility and to better defend attorney interests. In
the words of one Shanghai attorney, reform will come, but it will come
slowly.
278
E. Legal Advisor to the NPC: Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences
The enactment of the rule of law is as much a technical feat as it is a
reflection of political will. A commitment to establish a stable legal system is
realizable only insofar as a nation's leaders have access to the substantive
legal expertise they need to make sound decisions concerning legal reform. In
the PRC, the dearth of legislators with a legal education makes the need for
outside advice especially pertinent.279 According to one scholar who has
worked closely with the Shanghai People's Congress, the vast majority of







278. See SBA Interview B.
279. One scholar estimates that less than five percent of all legislators, whether at the national
level or at the local level, have had a legal education. See Academic Interview A.
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of what such reform might entail.280 They genuinely believe that the PRC
cannot prosper without the rule of law, but they do not know, from an
operational standpoint, how to accomplish this goal.2 8'
When looking for substantive expertise, both the central leadership and
local governments turn primarily to legal scholars, especially to leading law
professors from throughout the PRC. This reliance on outside expertise, in
turn, creates a window of opportunity for the academic world to influence
policy development, the drafting of new legislation, and the implementation of
new laws. According to some scholars, such influence is important because
the academic world is more inclined to advocate broader and more
comprehensive reforms than those proposed by government officials on their
own. 
2 8 3
The role played by legal scholars is broad. They range from service as
official advisors to state organs, to participation in ad hoc commissions that
have been convened by the government to study a particular legal issue, to the
conduct of independently initiated research and the submission of their
findings to the government for possible incorporation into policy, to service as
instructors in specially organized legal education classes for government
leaders, to informal discussion of issues with their friends in government
circles. 28 4 Although most scholarly participation occurs directly between the
scholar and the government, a limited amount of activity occurs through
institutional intermediaries. This case study examines the role of the Law
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [Zhongguo Shehui Kexue
Xueyuan Faxue Yanjiu Suo] (Law Institute), a quasi-governmental but
relatively independent research institute that regularly advises the Chinese
central government on legal issues.
1. Introduction to the Law Institute
The Law Institute was established in 1958 as a national-level legal
research center within the Chinese Academy of Science before being
transferred to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1979.285 The
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in turn, had been founded on the model
of Academica Sinica in Taiwan-as a government-funded brain trust which
would exist outside the state apparatus with no formal powers and engage in
independent research on which the government could draw when setting
policy.286 Currently, the Law Institute employs approximately 140
researchers, publishes two legal journals, has research divisions in nine areas
280. See id.
281. See id.; CASS Law Institute Interview A.
282. See Academic Interview B; CJS Interview A.
283. See Academic Interview A; CJS Interview A.
284. See Academic Interview A.
285. See THE LAW INSTITUTE OF THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES: AN
INTRODUCTION 4 (1996) [hereinafter LAW INSTITUTE INTRO].
286. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
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of law, and operates nine research centers.28 7 Although researchers draw
salaries directly from the central government and all of the Law Institute's
operating funds come from the government, neither the government nor the
researchers themselves consider Law Institute researchers to be government
employees.
288
Historically, the Law Institute has played an active role in advising the
NPC on legislation and in advocating increased use of legal mechanisms for
ruling the PRC. As early as the late 1970s, the Law Institute and other
research centers of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have aided
central government officials in developing theoretical, ideological, and
intellectual bases to justify the PRC's transformation from a command
economy into a market system. 289 In 1980, the Law Institute argued for the
Gang of Four to be tried in accordance with a newly promulgated criminal
code290 instead of with anti-counterrevolutionary regulations that dated back
to the Cultural Revolution. 291 Since 1982, either at the request of the NPC or
on its own volition, the Law Institute has systematically helped draft,
suggested revisions to, and submitted commentary on amendments to the
Chinese Constitution and over fifty laws, including such important legislation
as the Criminal Procedure Law (1996), the new Criminal Law (1997), and the
Company Law (1993).292 In addition, Law Institute researchers also have been
seconded to various government ministries to assist with drafting
implementing regulations, have been consulted by the courts and the
procuracy for legal advice, have convened academic conferences on various
legal subjects, and have taught courses to familiarize government officials
with the law.293 Of the seven times since 1995 that President Jiang Zemin has
convened special lectures on law for the highest level of the Chinese
leadership, three have been conducted by Law Institute personnel.294
2. The Law Institute's Influence
The influence of academics on the legislative process is difficult to
measure because much of the influence occurs outside the public's view.
Furthermore, the method of influence varies widely depending on context.
Sometimes the influence is direct, such as when government authorities
directly adopt a scholar's recommended revisions to draft legislation. Other
times, the influence is indirect, such as when scholarly opinion slowly
287. See LAW INSTITUTE INTRO, supra note 285, at 4-5.
288. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
289. See id.
290. See Criminal Law (1979) (last modified Apr. 7, 1998) <http:llwww.qis.net/chinalaw/
prclaw60.htm>.
291. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
292. See LAW INSTrrUTE INTRo, supra note 285, at 5-6.
293. See id. at 6; CASS Law Institute Interview A.
294. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
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changes the thinking of government officials. Despite difficulties in
quantifying such influence, it is believed to be extensive.295 According to one
scholar active in Shanghai politics, the Shanghai government adopts over fifty
percent of the recommendations submitted by its outside academic advisors. 96
Many other scholars point to examples of scholarly advice leading
government officials to implement certain previously unconsidered reforms.
297
Scholars who have lectured to government officials on legal issues also report
instances of the same officials later publicly adopting the views expressed in
their lectures.
298
The Law Institute has enjoyed its share of such success. Among the
examples cited by one Law Institute researcher were the inclusion of a
provision on legal aid in the Lawyers Law (1996) and the change in the
Chinese leadership's conception of rule of law. In 1995, the Law Institute, on
its own initiative, submitted a report to the NPC, criticizing the initial draft of
the Lawyers Law for failing to support legal aid.299 In response to the report,
the NPC inserted an additional chapter into the final draft of the Lawyers
Law,300 which imposed on attorneys an "obligation to provide legal assistance
[to the indigent] in accordance with state regulations." 301 In the second
example, Law Institute researchers again took initiative. During the early
stages of President Jiang's advocacy of legal reform, official government
policy called for enacting "rule by law." Believing that reform based on "rule
by law" would be too instrumental, the Law Institute convened a conference
on the "rule of law," substituting the government's use of the word 'fazhi"-
meaning "rule by law"--with a homonym which meant "rule of law."
302
Using the materials from the conference, the Law Institute then lobbied the
Chinese leadership quietly to change its criteria for legal reform, ultimately
convincing the Chinese leadership to abandon its original definition of 'fazhi"
in favor of the more progressive homonym.
303
Both Law Institute researchers and outsiders believe that the Law
Institute has a greater voice in central government policy than any other
research center.304 This influence arises from four sources, most of which are
related to the Law Institute's close relationship with the central government.
The first is the government's traditional reliance on the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences for advice.30 5 The second comes from the stature of the Law
Institute's leadership. For much of its history, many of the directors and vice
directors of the Law Institute have been members of the NPC Committee on
295. See Academic Interview A; CASS Law Institute Interview A; CIS Interview A.
296. See Academic Interview A.
297. See, e.g., infra notes 300-301, 322 and accompanying text.
298. See Academic Interview A; CIS Interview A.
299. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
300. See id.
301. Lawyers Law, ch. VI (1996) (last modified Apr. 7, 1998) <http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/
prclaw58.htm>.
302. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
303. See id.
304. See id.; CIS Interview A.
305. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
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Legal Affairs or members of the Chinese Communist Party's Political
Consultative Conference. 3°6 The presence of senior members of the Law
Institute in these two politically influential bodies permits the Law Institute to
participate in policy-making in a way that other research centers cannot.
The third advantage enjoyed by the Law Institute stems from its ability
to use internal channels to communicate with government leaders. As part of
its reporting duties to the central government, the Law Institute periodically
submits reports to the Chinese leadership, summarizing its research
307findings. In recent years, the Law Institute has increasingly used these
reports, called yaobao, as a tool to draw the attention of senior officials to
issues that its researchers believe the government has overlooked.30 8 The
yaobao reporting process in effect permits the Law Institute to initiate reforms
indirectly through a route that is unavailable to other organizations.
Finally, the practice of seconding Law Institute personnel to government
agencies also enhances the quality of the advice given. Among the limits to
the scholarly community's ability to provide sound advice to government
leaders is the lack of access to government data.30 9 This lack of data means
that scholars often advise in a vacuum, relying primarily on legal theory and
without an understanding of the factual context surrounding a problem. Law
Institute researchers, however, are temporarily considered to be staff members
of the agencies to which they are assigned.310 Such insider status permits them
to see government data, which then permits them to give more effective
advice.
3. Is the Law Institute Sufficiently Independent To Be Considered an
NGO?
Its close ties with the central government raise questions about whether
the Law Institute is sufficiently independent to be considered an NGO.
Despite the willingness of government officials to listen to legal experts, the
experts most trusted might not necessarily be the most objective. The scholar
who too frequently, or too severely, criticizes those who call upon him for
advice will not be consulted often because policy-makers will perceive him to
be overly hostile.312 The frequency with which the central government
consults the Law Institute and the high degree of respect the Chinese
leadership has for its opinions313 could create an institutional reluctance to
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considered to be more conservative than the research centers organized by
many Chinese law schools. 314 Such conservatism perhaps reflects the Law
Institute's perception of itself as legal advisor to the government,315 but this is
a perception that might lead its researchers to question only the technical
soundness of a proposed policy without reference to the legitimacy of its
underlying substantive goals.
Notwithstanding these doubts, the Law Institute can be considered
independent for two reasons. First, as the examples cited above show, Law
Institute researchers have been proactive in raising legal issues to the
government's attention.316 According to one source, Law Institute researchers
see their role as not only providing advice when asked, but also acting
affirmatively to guide the government in its understanding of what the rule of
law demands.31 Second, by seeing themselves foremost as scholars, Law
Institute researchers draw upon an intellectual tradition that places the scholar
outside the state apparatus but allocates for him an obligation to serve
society.31s While it might be the scholar's lot to respect the government's
authority to set policy, such deference does not prevent him from trying to
persuade the government to adjust its policy when he believes that the policy
can be improved. In other words, although there might not be room for open
dissent, there is much opportunity for constructive criticism through internal
channels.
F. Academic Approach: Center for Judicial Studies
The ability of university-based legal research centers to advance legal
reform differs from that of the Law Institute. With fewer ties to state
authorities, they exert only indirect influence. This case study examines the
experiences of the Center for Judicial Studies (CJS), a legal research center
that was established in 1996 within Beijing University's law department. The
analysis focuses on the role of academic NGOs in promoting legal reform in
the PRC.
1. The Role ofAcademic Legal Research Centers
University-based legal research centers help promote the rule of law in
three ways: First, they engage in academic research on a variety of legal
issues. Much of this research involves comparative studies of Chinese law and
foreign laws, with the goal being to understand which foreign laws can serve
as models for Chinese legislative reform and how such laws should be
modified to fit within the context of Chinese society.319 Second, legal research
centers provide a pool of experts whom the government can consult for
314. See id.
315. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
316. See supra notes 290-291, 299-303 and accompanying text.
317. See CASS Law Institute Interview A.
318. See supra notes 275-288 and accompanying text.
319. See CJS Interview A.
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substantive expertise. At times, a center as a whole serves as a consultant on
certain discrete issues but usually only on an ad hoc basis. Third, research
centers provide an institutional base through which scholars can coordinate
their activities. Having such a base facilitates the organization of scholarly
conferences, the systematic publication of legal materials, and exchange
across disciplines. 32 Having a discrete institutional structure apart from the
state and apart from their mother universities also makes research centers a
more attractive candidate for outside funding.
321
Since 1996, the CJS has engaged in a number of projects which have
contributed in varying degrees to legal reform. For example, CJS members
meeting informally with high court officials from Hebei Province convinced
the court to establish a rule prohibiting judges from having ex parte contact
with litigants when the opposing party is not present.322 The Kunming City
Intermediate Court in Yunnan Province developed discovery rules based on
advice it received from the CJS. 323 As part of its Judicial Library Series, the
CJS published a six-volume translation of the opinions of famous Western
jurists. This collection has been warmly received to the point that the National
Judge's College has purchased complete sets for its students. 324 Legal
conferences organized by the CJS have been heavily attended, not only by law
students but also by government officials.325 Such activities are in addition to
the legal research sponsored by the CJS, the results of which are published in
326academic journals or popular media.
2. The Trade-Off Between Independence and Influence
Although research centers such as the CJS can list many examples of
how they have helped shape new legislation, improve court procedures, and
increase both the government's and the public's knowledge of the law, they
lack the direct influence on policy that organizations with closer government
ties wield. Unlike the Law Institute, the CJS receives no government funding,
has no formal interaction with the government beyond that initiated by
government officials themselves, and does not have access to internal
communication channels such as the yaobao reporting process.
327
320. See id.
321. See Academic Interview D.




326. Major research projects undertaken by the CJS include (1) amassing an oral history of the
Chinese legal profession since the early twentieth century; (2) studies on why many Chinese citizens
believe that it is unnecessary for legal professionals to have a legal education; (3) studies on the
selection of judges in the countryside; and (4) studies on how to improve the legal reasoning of judges.
See id.
327. See id. For a discussion of the yaobao reporting process, see supra notes 307-308 and
accompanying text.
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Furthermore, as a matter of internal policy, the CJS insists on maintaining a
certain distance from the state.328 This distance helps preserve scholarly
independence, but it comes at the price of a much reduced voice in
government affairs. Unlike the Law Institute, the CJS sees itself as, and
indeed is limited as a practical matter to, playing a background role-using
legal scholarship as a mechanism for slowly changing the government's, the
public's, and the legal profession's understanding of what the law should
be.
329
Because the contributions of research centers to legal reform rest
primarily with their ability to reshape legal culture, their effectiveness
becomes difficult to measure. Although anecdotal evidence shows instances
when specific advice has led to specific reform,330 the extent to which
government officials see legal scholars as more than technical advisors to be
consulted on discrete legal issues remains unclear. Furthermore, anecdotal
evidence shows Chinese leaders incorporating the academic community's
view of the rule of law into their official policy pronouncements, 331 but
Chinese leaders have not engaged in reform with the vigor or speed that the
academic community would like.332 Indeed, despite the respect accorded to
the expertise of legal scholars, many government officials believe the
academic community to be out of touch with the sociopolitical realities of the
PRC.333 The assertion that the academic community's views on legal reforms
fail to account for the "nation's special circumstances" is a frequent
criticism,334 and it indicates that a substantial gap continues to exist between
the government's view toward reform and that of legal scholars.
The impact of research centers on the general public's understanding of
the law is even more difficult to gauge. With the CJS, for example, the
academic nature of most of its activities means that the average citizen is
unaware of them. Although legal scholars often publish essays on legal reform
in popular newspapers, 335 their effect on molding public opinion is unknown.
Large gaps exist between the academic understanding of law and the public's
understanding.336 In the criminal field, for example, although many scholars
believe that the law should constrain the state in its exercise of power against
defendants, including those who have been convicted of a crime, much of the
public still adheres to the traditional communist view that criminals, by virtue
of their conduct, have removed themselves from the social order and thus
should enjoy no rights.3 37 Compounding this problem is the tendency of the
328. See CJS Interview A.
329. See id.
330. See supra notes 295-296,299-301, 322-326 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text; see also Academic Interview A (citing
examples of Shanghai government leaders adopting views expressed during specially organized lectures
on the rule of law).
332. See CJS Interview A; Academic Interview A.
333. See CJS Interview A; Academic Interview A.
334. CJS Interview A.
335. See Chen, supra note 17.
336. See Academic Interview A.
337. See CJS Interview A.
Legal Reform in China
public to view macroscopic legal changes as a topic better left for the
academic community to discuss and for the government to decide.338 Insofar
as the average citizen concerns himself with learning about the law, the focus
appears to be immediate and utilitarian-essentially, what he needs to know to
resolve the problem at hand instead of theories on what the system should be.
These limits on the power of academic research centers to initiate
change, however, should not be fatal to the claim that they are important to
legal reform. Although not well funded, and still tied to their parent
universities, research centers such as the CJS can be seen as the Chinese
analogues to nonprofit think tanks in the West. The same criticisms that apply
to the CJS-for example, about its ability to play only an indirect role in
reform-can apply just as easily to such American NGOs as the Rand
Corporation, the Urban Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute. Yet
the existence of these criticisms does not detract from the role of research-
oriented NGOs as a vital source of information. In the United States, for
example, much social science research on the law, the economy, domestic
issues, and international problems originates from NGO-sponsored projects.339
Many of these projects test the empirical validity of the assumptions under
which certain government policies are made or gauge the effects of such
policies.340 Although the political climate in the PRC is likely to continue to
prohibit open criticism of government policy,341 the experiences of the CJS
show that academic research centers can serve as vehicles through which
nongovernmental experts can expand the depth of public discourse on
important legal issues.342
338. See Academic Interview A.
339. See, e.g., Kathryn Kranhold, Solo LegalArbitrators Put Longtime Leader in a Jam, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996, at CA2 (mentioning a Rand Corporation study of arbitration practices in the Los
Angeles area); Michael M. Phillips, Dealer Loses: A Crack Gang's Accounting Ledger Says a Lot About
the Economics of the Drug Business, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, at 26 (describing the National Bureau
of Economic Research's study of the economics of crack dealing); Survey Finds Perception Gap in US.,
Hong Kong Expectations, ASIAN WEEK, May 8, 1997, at 10 (discussing the Committee of 100's study of
American perceptions of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty).
340. See, e.g., Carol Gentry, Study Says Housing Ills Grow as Federal Aid Shrinks, WALL ST.
J., June 3, 1998, at NE (discussing the New England Housing Network's study of the effects decreased
federal funding for public housing has on low-income families in New England); John Harwood, Poor
Results: Think Tanks Battle To Judge the Impact of Welfare Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1998, at Al
(mentioning the launch of the Urban Institute's five-year, $30-million study of the overhaul of the
American welfare system).
341. See infra Section Ill.A.
342. See John Pomfret, Politics Stirs Crackdown in China; New Party Threatens Ruling
Communists, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1999, at A23 (describing "freewheeling debates on political reforn"
in PRC think tanks, but also stating that the presence of such debates does not necessarily translate into
democracy or even more limited political reform in the future). But see Edward X. Gu, 'Non-
establishment' Intellectuals, Public Space, and the Creation of Non-Governmental Organizations in
China: The Chen Ziming- Wang Juntao Saga, 1998 CHINA J. 39, 39 ("The public space within which
intellectuals undertake political policy-relevant research is heavily monitored and controlled by the
Party-state.').
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G. Protecting Consumer Rights: The China Consumers Association
Of the NGOs profiled herein, the China Consumers' Association
(Xiaofeizhe Xiehui) (CCA) most closely resembles, in terms of structure,
function, and legal status, the Chinese government's vision of an NGO. 343 The
questions raised by this case study concern (1) the relationship between the
state and state-sponsored NGOs, (2) the law-related ways in which state-
sponsored NGOs in general, and the CCA in particular, assist state organs in
implementing government-directed policy goals, and (3) the potential for
independent action by state-sponsored NGOs. It also illustrates the role of
NGOs in offering alternatives to court resolution of legal disputes.
1. Introduction to the CCA
The CCA traces its roots to a proposal jointly submitted in the early
1980s to the State Council by three central government agencies. The proposal
sought to establish an NGO for the purpose of protecting consumers from
unscrupulous business practices that were becoming commonplace as the PRC
began to introduce market mechanisms into its economy.344 The goal was to
create a body that would represent the interests of consumers, assist in the
dissemination of relevant knowledge, and provide alternate, unofficial
channels for resolving consumer disputes.345 In December 1984, the State
Council approved the proposal and established the CCA.346
The CCA's promotional literature describe its aims as providing "social
supervision on commodities and services," providing "protection to
consumers' rights and interests," providing "reasonable and scientific
guidance on consumers' activities," and promoting "a healthy development of
the socialist market economy." 347 In 1993, the NPC passed the PRC's first
comprehensive consumer protection law-the Law for the Protection of
Consumer Rights and Interests (Consumer Protection Law)-which assigned
seven tasks to the CCA: (1) provide relevant information to consumers; (2)
help relevant government authorities supervise and inspect commodities and
services; (3) advise relevant government authorities on consumer affairs; (4)
receive, investigate, and mediate consumer complaints; (5) appraise the
quality of commodities or services whose quality has been the subject of a
complaint; (6) support consumers in lawsuits against violations of consumer
interests; and (7) use the media to expose and criticize activities that violate
consumer interests.
348
343. For a discussion of the Chinese government's attitude toward NGOs, see supra notes 58-
61 and accompanying text.
344. See CCA Interview A.
345. See id.
346. See CHINA CONSUMERS' ASSOCIATION, CHINA'S CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS IN
PROGRESS I (1994) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS].
347. CHINA CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION INTRODUCTORY BROCHURE 2 (1998) [hereinafter CCA
BROCHURE].
348. See Law for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, art. 32 (1993).
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Since 1984, the CCA has established over 20,000 local branches, over
3000 offices at the county-level or above, and approximately 25,000 liaison
points at various schools, enterprises, and administrative departments.
349
Beyond regular paid employees, it relies on over 50,000 volunteers to staff its
operations.350  Most of its budget comes directly from the central
government.35 1 As with other government-sponsored organizations, many of
the CCA's top-level personnel are former government officials, particularly
from the National Bureau of Industry and Commerce (Guojia Gongshang Ju)
and the National Bureau of Standards (Guojia Biaojun Ju), both of which
have regulatory authority over some consumer affairs and both of which were
instrumental in the formation of the CCA.352 Over the years, however, the
number of former government officials who have been sent to the CCA has
dropped considerably.
353
2. The Breadth of the CCA 's Activities
The CCA engages in a number of activities to protect consumer rights,
some of which are more directly related to the law than others. Roughly
speaking, these activities can be broken into four categories: (1) research on
consumer issues; (2) dissemination of knowledge to the public; (3) mediation
of consumer disputes; and (4) advice to the government on consumer related
issues. Such activities show the CCA to be an assistant to state actors in the
enforcement of consumer protection regulations.
Research conducted by the CCA includes market surveys, quality
assessments, comparisons of similar products, and safety tests.354 The goal of
such research focuses largely on acquiring information for use by the public,
manufacturers, retailers, and the government in promoting honest business355
dealings, heightening safety, and enhancing product quality. In addition, the
CCA investigates thousands of manufacturers and retailers annually to
ascertain the quality of the goods sold or services provided.356 Although the
CCA, as an NGO, has no authority to launch criminal investigations, it often
works together with government agencies in its investigations, 357 thereby
playing a quasi-governmental role in the enforcement of consumer
regulations. Furthermore, even when government participation is absent from
349. See CCA BROCHURE, supra note 347, at 2.
350. See id.
351. See CCA Interview A; see also CCA BROCHURE, supra note 347, at 2 ("CCA is financed
by governmental aid and social donations..).
352. See CCA Interview A.
353. See Id.
354. See CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, supra note 346, at 2-3.
355. See CCA Interview A.
356. See CCA BROCHURE, supra note 347, at 15.
357. See id.
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an investigation, the CCA may submit its findings to the relevant state
authorities for a possible government response.
358
Consumer education is a primary goal of the CCA.359 CCA efforts to
disseminate knowledge cover a broad spectrum of information. Such
dissemination occurs primarily through media channels, through organized
events, such as the events held every March 15 on World Consumer Rights
Day, and through the fielding by CCA staff of telephone calls from
360disgruntled consumers. Some dissemination efforts focus on product
knowledge: A prime example is the publication of the results of product
quality tests conducted by the CCA.361 Other efforts focus on consumer rights.
The CCA seeks to increase consumer awareness of the legal protections
provided by the Consumer Protection Law; it also attempts to warn consumers
362of legal dangers in certain types of market transactions. 2 One recent example
of such warnings involved newspaper publication of explanations for
commonly used contractual terms after a rash of adverse court judgments
against consumers who had entered into real estate contracts without fully
understanding the implications of their provisions. 363 The CCA also uses the
media to highlight certain cases that can serve as models for instructing the
public on certain types of consumer problems.
364
With respect to the enforcement of Chinese consumer regulations, the
CCA plays a more active role. First, the CCA fields complaints from
disgruntled consumers and then attempts to mediate the dispute.3 65 Such
mediation activity constitutes a large portion of the CCA's work. Since 1996,
its offices have received over three million complaints and successfully settled
approximately ninety-seven percent of them.366 Although the role of the CCA
in settling disputes is that of an impartial mediator rather than an advocate for
the aggrieved consumer, its participation usually encourages retailers to settle
more quickly and more favorably than if the consumer had not contacted the
CCA.3 67 Part of the reason for this increased willingness to settle disputes is
the perception that the CCA speaks with the unofficial backing of the
government.368 If the retailer had indeed violated consumer regulations, it
would be better off resolving the dispute through the CCA's informal
channels than facing official government prosecution. 369 Second, the CCA
358. See CCA Interview A.
359. See id.
360. See CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, supra note 346, at 3-5; CCA BROCHURE, supra
note 347, at 17-18.
361. See CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, supra note 346, at 2-4.
362. See CCA Interview A.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT CONSUMERS, supra note 346, at 2; CCA BROCHURE, supra
note 347, at 2.
366. See CCA BROCHURE, supra note 347, at 13. In 1998 alone, the CCA fielded
approximately 667,000 complaints. See News: Pacific Rim and Asia, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 15,
1999, at A3.




tracks violations, referring retailers with particularly egregious violations or
with multiple violations to government authorities for prosecution.370 Third,
when mediation fails, the CCA often encourages disgruntled consumers to
seek legal redress. 371 The Consumer Protection Law charges the CCA with
supporting consumer-initiated lawsuits against violators. 372 The law, however,
does not define what the CCA's duty to support such litigation actually
entails, and the CCA remains unsure about how extensive a role it should play
in this regard.373 To date, much of the CCA's support has been in the form of
access to legal advice. Over the past year, CCA branches, however, have
begun to coordinate with local law firms, arranging for firms to send lawyers
to CCA offices to advise disgruntled consumers on the merits of litigation.
Beyond disseminating information and assisting with the enforcement of
consumer protection laws, the CCA has played a central role in advising the
government on consumer issues. Some of the impetus to adopt the Consumer
Protection Law, for example, arose from CCA lobbying for greater legal
protection for Chinese consumers. 375 Indeed, the CCA prepared the initial
draft of the Consumer Protection Law and participated extensively in
376subsequent revisions of the draft.
Since the passage of the Consumer Protection Law in 1993, the CCA has
continued to push for further legislative reforms. In this regard, the CCA is
less a lobbyist in the Western sense of the word and more of a technical
advisor.377 It attempts to prompt legislative reform in largely a passive
manner, primarily by submitting through formal channels the results of its
research findings, by identifying recurring consumer problems, and by
recommending new product standards. 378 To date, these efforts have met with
varying degrees of success, with the most notable being the passage of
regulations governing the quality of electronic goods.379 Other CCA activities
with respect to defining legal rules include its request to the Supreme People's
Court to issue an official interpretation to clarify certain ambiguities in the





372. See Law for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, art. 32(6) (1993).
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3. The Character of a Quasi-Governmental NGO
As an organization, the CCA shares many similarities with the All China
Lawyers Association (ACLA): Both organizations exist officially outside the
government apparatus but operate as state-sponsored NGOs, perform quasi-
regulatory functions under the supervision of state organs, and have close
working ties with state actors. From my conversations with representatives of
the CCA and the ACLA, these state-sponsored NGOs appear to operate
largely according to the paradigm of state-led civil society.3 2 Yet there are
also signs of a desire for increased independence.
According to these conversations, both the CCA and the ACLA see
themselves as separate from the state but operating within certain government-
imposed confines.383 The feature most frequently raised in both conversations
to distinguish the organization from its state counterpart was the lack of
formal regulatory authority over the subject matter to which they were
assigned. For example, the CCA official with whom I spoke complained
about the CCA's need to rely on several different administrative agencies to
enforce consumer protection laws.384 When the CCA found a violation or
believed that certain reforms were needed, it could only refer the matter to the
government; it could not sanction the violator directly or enact new
regulations. Similarly, the ACLA officials with whom I spoke complained
about the ACLA's lack of disciplinary authority over wayward attorneys. 385 If
the ACLA found a violation or believed that certain reforms were needed, it
had to rely on the Ministry of Justice to act. Implicit in both sets of complaints
was the belief that if the CCA or the ACLA were indeed part of the
govemment they would be able to take more aggressive action in protecting
consumer rights or regulating the legal profession. Yet both the CCA and the
ACLA representatives with whom I spoke also predicted a gradual increase in
their organization's authority to regulate directly consumer affairs and the
legal profession over the next several years.386
There also was a tendency for both CCA and ACLA staff to see their
respective organizations as being in a subordinate relationship to the state. The
conversations reflected a belief that the state retained full authority to decide
the respective issues that the CCA and the ACLA were assigned to monitor.
The organizations' role was only to assist the state in enacting its policies.
According to one CCA representative, political sensitivities prevent the CCA
from criticizing government policies with which it disagrees. 317 Instead,
advocacy is always in the form of suggestions.
Ironically, the law itself functions as a limit on the organizations'
willingness to be more proactive. The CCA defined its role by referring to the
382. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
383. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
384. See CCA Interview A.
385. See ACLA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
386. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
387. See CCA Interview A.
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Consumer Protection Law,388 while the ACLA defined its role by referring to
the Lawyers Law.389 Both the CCA and the ACLA viewed these laws as
establishing substantive limits on the activities of the two organizations.
390
Insofar as either organization wished to do more, it believed that it could not
expand its activities until the NPC amended the Consumer Protection Law or
the Lawyers Law to permit the organization to take over responsibilities
currently assigned to state actors.391
III. OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STRONG NONPROFIT SECTOR
Part II of this Article demonstrated that Chinese NGOs can contribute in
at least eleven ways to the development of the rule of law in the PRC:
(1) Supplement the state's and the private sector's efforts to
provide legal services to people who cannot afford legal
representation.
392
(2) Increase public awareness of rights, legal duties, and avenues
for redress; expand public awareness of the legal significance
attached to one's behavior.393
(3) Aid law enforcement by helping plaintiffs challenge
violations of law or by reporting such violations to the
appropriate authorities.394
(4) Assist ordinary citizens in challenging arbitrary or erroneous
action on the part of governmental officials.
395
(5) Assist the state in regulating certain professions or market
activities, function as institutions to which the state can
delegate regulatory authority, and serve as sources for
standards above and beyond the minimum limits imposed by
law.
396
(6) Develop substantive expertise for use in advising government
leaders on legislation, implementation, and policy formation;
388. See id.
389. See ACLA Interview B.
390. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
391. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
392. See, e.g., supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
393. See, e.g., supra Sections II.B, I.G.
394. See, e.g., supra Sections II.B, II.G.
395. See, e.g., supra Sections I.A, I.B, II.C, II.D.
396. See, e.g., supra Sections I.D, EI.G.
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influence the Chinese leadership's conception of the role of
law in society.
397
(7) Advocate the interests of disadvantaged segments of the
community; draw attention to legal problems about which the
mainstream community or the government might not be
aware.
398
(8) Mount indirect challenges to government policy by
suggesting reforms, litigating unlawful implementation
methods, or encouraging some state organs to curb the
activity of others.399
(9) Assist in the training of members of the legal profession
(including law students) and in the inculcation of a sense of
ethical responsibility and public service.
400
(10) Serve as structures through which private parties interested in
legal reform can pool resources and organize their
401activities.
(11) Mediate private disputes and provide alternate forums for
dispute resolution.
40 2
The experiences of the eight NGOs profiled in Part II prove the
feasibility of NGO involvement in legal reform. They also show, however,
that such involvement occurs within fixed parameters-that NGO
participation in Chinese legal reform has distinct characteristics brought about
by the political climate, regulatory environment, and socioeconomic context
of the PRC. These characteristics generally restrict NGO autonomy, thereby
discouraging independent initiative. They also handicap the development of a
strong, independent nonprofit sector as an alternative to the government and
the private sector. This part examines the constraints on NGO activity in the
PRC.
A. Political Constraints: The Needfor a Political Patron
The political constraints on NGO activity express themselves in a
number of different forms. The most direct constraint is the CCP's willingness
to suppress NGOs that it perceives to be hostile to its authority. This
willingness to suppress allegedly hostile organizations was most visibly
397. See, e.g., supra Sections ll.B, II.E, H.F.
398. See, e.g., supra Sections II.B, II.G.
399. See, e.g., supra Sections IB, II.D, ll.F.
400. See, e.g., supra Sections II.C, ll.D.
401. See, e.g., supra Sections Il.C, II.F.
402. See, e.g., supra Sections lI.C, II.G.
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exhibited in the latter half of 1998, when the government cracked down on
dissident efforts to form the PRC's first legally registered opposition party.
4 0 3
This crackdown led to the arrest, prosecution, and sentencing of the
movement's leaders to over ten years of prison each.4° Indeed, many believe
that the high profile of the suppression was meant to be a message from the
government to activist members of the public: The exercise of one's freedom
of association shall be acceptable only if such exercise does not seek to negate
the CCP's leadership.4 °5
Accompanying the crackdown were other efforts to tighten control over
the freedom of association. These efforts included the promulgation of rules
threatening film directors, singers, and software developers with life
imprisonment if they attempt to "overthrow state power" or "endanger
national security"; 406 the exclusion of legal recognition for trade union bodies
other than those under the All China Federation of Trade Unions;4°7 and new
regulations to control e-mail networks more tightly.40 8
This threat of suppression means that Chinese NGOs do not follow the
adversarial model adopted by many NGOs in the West. When discussing their
relations with the government, the NGOs profiled in Part II most often
described these relations in one of two ways. Some identified themselves
primarily as intermediaries between the state and the people-essentially
vehicles that educate the public about the laws handed down by the Chinese
leadership and through which the sentiments of the ordinary citizen can
403. See Jonathan Mirsky, More Arrests Despite the "Dialogue" on Human Rights, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., July 27, 1998, at 8 (describing the arrest in July 1998 of five dissidents who attempted to
register an opposition party in June 1998); see also Michael Laris, China Holds Five Trying To Form
New Party; Former Premier Li Denounces Activists, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al (describing the
arrest in December 1998 of five dissidents for their continued involvement in attempting to register an
opposition party).
404. See John Pomfret, China Tightens Reins on Dissent; Some Professionals Face Life in
Prison, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al (describing sentencing of Xu Wenli to thirteen years in
prison, Qin Yongmin to twelve years in prison, and Wang Youcai to eleven years in prison).
405. See Mary Kwang, China's Dissident Movement Gets a New Lease on Life, STRAITS TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1999, at 40 (quoting Premier Li Peng as saying that groups that try "to negate the leadership of
the Communist Party... will not be allowed to exist"); China: Li: NPC Has No Plans for Structural
Reform, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20479584 (same); see also Michael Laris,
China Says Dissident Is "Security" Suspect; Charge Seen as Warning to Opposition Party, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at A36 (describing arrest of democracy activist Xu Wenli as a "warning to other
would-be leaders" of a Chinese opposition party); Pomfret, supra note 342 (describing crackdown as
both in line with CCP intolerance of organized dissent and also part of a general political tightening); cf.
John Mintz & Bart Gellman, U.S. Fears More Extensive Political Crackdown in China, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 1999, at A13 (expressing fears that the Chinese government might imprison hundreds of
activists in order to prevent the formation of the PRC's first opposition party).
406. Matt Forney, Officials Are Muzzling Opposing Opinions Despite Rights Accord, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1998, at 1 ("[China has] widened its campaign against more political openness to
include the media, academics and artists.'); see also Pomfret, supra note 342.
407. See Jasper Becker, A Crackdown on Non-Governmental Groups Has Crushed the Hopes
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percolate up to the Chinese leadership.40 9 Others portrayed themselves as
outside bodies of expertise, available to advise on public issues whenever the
government desires such advice.410 Either way, implicit in the two portrayals
is the image of the NGO as an assistant to the government, helping the
government better accomplish official goals, instead of a maverick who
breaks from accepted policy to pursue an independent agenda or a critic who
challenges the government's decisions. Even the more activist organizations
tend to describe their activities as drawing crucial issues to the gJovernment's
attention rather than pressuring the government for reform. 11 Similarly,
NGOs that challenge government action in court tend to characterize their
challenges as attempts to ensure that local government conduct is consistent
with the standards articulated by the central government rather than as
opposition to official policy.
412
The initiative taken by many of the eight NGOs to change government
policy 413 shows that some of this self-avowed deference to the government is
simply lip service-a way of dressing up activism as advice in order to fit it
within the confines of acceptable political behavior. But such deference also
reflects to some degree a genuine perception on the part of some NGOs,
especially those with close ties to the government, that an independent NGO
community at this point in time would disrupt social stability.414 Some
organizations are used to being led by the state and thus believe their proper
role is to work within the parameters of the authority the state has delegated to
them and to execute the mission the state has defined for them.415 But
regardless of the degree to which an NGO actually believes that it should play
only a supporting role to the government, the result of this deference is likely
to be self-restraint on the part of NGOs in opposing government policy. The
deference model allocates to the state primary responsibility for directing legal
reform.
From a power-dynamics perspective, the image of the NGO as an
assistant to the government also reflects the high degree to which power
remains concentrated in state organs instead of dispersed throughout society at
large. For example, as the experiences of the SBA and the CCA evince, the
ability of NGOs to protect the legal rights of their constituents often hinges on
their ability to mobilize government organs to intercede on their behalf,
especially when the threat arises from another government arm.416 In the
legislative context, the experiences of the Law Institute and the CJS show that
409. See, e.g., CCA Interview A; BWC Interview A.
410. See, e.g., CASS Interview A; CJS Interview A; supra Subsection ll.F.1.
411. See, e.g., BWC Interview B; CJS Interview A; see also supra Subsection ll.F.2
(discussing difficulties associated with initiating change in government policy).
412. See, e.g., Wuhan Center Interview A; supra note 146 and accompanying text.
413. See supra Sections II.B, ).D, .E, ll.F, II.G.
414. Representatives from both the CCA and the ACLA said that although their respective
organizations favor greater autonomy, the current level of autonomy they enjoy is appropriate given the
PRC's current state of development. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B.
415. See CCA Interview A; ACLA Interview B; see also supra Subsection ll.G.3 (describing
the CCA's and the ACLA's views of their role).
416. See supra Subsection II.D.2; supra notes 368-370 and accompanying text.
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the ability of NGOs to initiate legal change depends on their ability to
convince government leaders to adopt their recommendations. 417 With only
the power to litigate administrative error and no power to compel more in-
depth change,418 Chinese NGOs often cannot be effective unless they are able
to associate themselves with a state actor-whether that actor is an
administrative agency or an influential government official. This reliance on a
government patron, however, means that the government can wield significant
indirect control over an NGO's activities. It also makes NGO-initiated reform
more conservative by establishing the patron's tolerance for reform as the de
facto limit on the scope and breadth of the change the NGO can successfully
advocate.
In short, these political constraints mean that the paradigm of state-led
civil society continues to apply to Chinese NGOs engaged in legal reform.
Although Part II of this Article demonstrated that Chinese NGOs can
contribute greatly to the establishment of a stable legal system in the PRC, it
remains unclear how much of their success is attributable to the central
government's own desire to promote rule of law. Where an NGO's interests
and the Chinese leadership's interests are aligned, the range of permissible
activity appears to be great, but where the interests are in direct conflict, it
appears that the NGO must defer. If this generalization is true, then perhaps
the fundamental factor to an NGO's ability to initiate reform becomes a
question of political astuteness: Is the NGO savvy enough to work for change
from within?
B. Legal Constraints: The Regulations on the Registration and
Management of Social Organizations
The political constraints on NGO autonomy are supplemented by a
regulatory environment designed to maximize government control over NGO
activity. For much of the past ten years, the central government regulated
NGOs through a set of regulations promulgated after the 1989 suppression of
democracy activists in Tiananmen Square.419 These regulations defined a two-
step registration process through which a social organization could obtain
formal legal status only if it found a state organ or CCP-affiliated body to
sponsor its existence and then obtained the approval of the Ministry of Civil
420Affairs (MCA). These regulations assigned to the sponsor primary
responsibility for supervising the organization's activities.421 They also vested
approval authority of the organization's budget and staffing plans in the
417. See supra Sections I.B, I.E, I.F.
418. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
419. See Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations (Shehui
Tuanti Dengfi Guanli Tiaoh) (1989) (visited Apr. 21, 2000) <http:lwww.chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/
ShowFrame.cgi> [hereinafter 1989 Regulations].
420. See id. arts. 2, 6, 7, 9-14.
421. See id. arts. 5-8,23-24.
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sponsor instead of in the organization itself.422 The effect of the sponsor
requirement was to favor the formation of NGOs by individuals with close ties
to the government, while making it difficult for those outside the state
establishment to organize formally. 423 The 1989 Regulations' prohibition of
multiple organizations in the same region from operating in the same field
424
also allowed government-sponsored NGOs to monopolize certain activities,
denying other organizations the opportunity to compete with them.
425
In November 1998, the State Council repealed the 1989 Regulations,
replacing them with a new set of Regulations on the Registration and
Administration of Social Organizations. These new regulations reaffirmed the
CCP's policy of strict oversight over NGOs, and indeed sought to tighten
government control over all types of social organizations. 42' The 1998
Regulations follow largely the regulatory structure enacted in the 1989
Regulations but changed this structure in nine major ways:
(1) Using language stronger than that in the 1989 Regulations,
they prohibit social organizations from acting in ways that
would violate government policy, harm national unity, or
endanger state security.427 Critics charge this new language
with foreclosing the opportunity for NGOs to dissent against
government policy.
428
(2) They set forth minimum membership and funding
requirements for the establishment of legally registered social
organizations.
429
(3) They add an extra step to the registration process, requiring
the social organization to first find a sponsor, second obtain
initial approval from the MCA to engage in preparatory
activities to establish the organization, and then obtain final
approval from the MCA for the formal founding of the
organization.430 The addition of this extra step was to prevent
groups from circumventing the registration process by
422. See id. art. 17.
423. See Academic Interview E.
424. See 1989 Regulations, art. 16.
425. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, BOUND AND GAGGED: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN CHINA
FURTHER CURTAILED UNDER NEW REGULATIONS 5 (1998) [hereinafter BOUND AND GAGGED].
426. See Becker, supra note 407, at 17 (quoting Asia NGO expert Allen Choate, who described
the 1998 Regulations as "tougher" and "more controlling').
427. Compare 1989 Regulations, art. 3, with Regulations on the Registration and
Administration of Social Organizations (Shehui TuantiDengii Guanli Tiaol) art. 10 (1998) (visited Apr.
21, 2000) <http://www.chinalawinfo.com/Freelaw/ShowFrame.cgi> [hereinafter 1998 Regulations].
428. See BOUND AND GAGGED, supra note 425, at 5.
429. See 1998 Regulations, art. 10 (1998).
430. Seeid. art. 12.
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operating in the guise of a preparatory committee for an
indefinite period of time.43'
(4) They permit the MCA to prohibit preemptively the
registration of any social organization that it believes will
engage in activities contrary to government policy.
432
(5) They prohibit individuals who have been deprived of their
political rights-namely political dissidents-from forming
or holding positions of responsibility in a social
organization.
(6) They define in detail the ways in which sponsors shall
supervise the social organization's activities. The 1989
Regulations did not define the sponsor's supervisory role
with particularity, and thus in practice, some sponsors
exercised only minimal supervision over the organizations
they sponsored.435
(7) They permit criminal prosecution of any party who acts
through an unregistered social organization.
436
(8) They do not contain the 1989 Regulations' procedures for
administrative appeal of the MCA's decisions, thereby
immunizing MCA decisions from challenge.
437
(9) They require all social organizations to re-register within one
year of the promulgation of the 1998 Regulations. 438 Critics
believe that the purpose behind this re-registration
requirement is the government's desire to purge the PRC of
431. See Becker, supra note 407, at 17.
432. See 1998 Regulations, art. 13(1).
433. See id. art. 13(3).
434. See id. art 28.
435. See BOUND AND GAGGED, supra note 425, at 4-5.
436. See 1998 Regulations, art. 35.
437. See BOUND AND GAGGED, supra note 425, at 3-4. Challenge of MCA decisions via the
Administrative Litigation Law (1991) (ALL) (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http://www.chinalawinfo.com/
Freelaw/Showframe.cgi> is also unavailable because the ALL permits challenges only when a relevant
law or regulation explicitly authorizes judicial review of the agency's decision, which the 1998
Regulations do not. See BOUND AND GAGGED, supra note 425, at 4-5; see also ALL, art. 12(4)
(excluding from the ALL's jurisdiction any act in which the administrative agency, by law, had final
authority to decide the issue); LIN FENG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES IN CHINA
146 (1996) (stating that finality provisions can deprive aggrieved parties of the right to resort to judicial
protection when they believe their rights have been infringed).
438. See 1998 Regulations, art 39.
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potentially threatening groups or to ensure that such groups
are more closely monitored by the state. 
439
Critics of the 1998 Regulations believe that these regulations, besides
increasing government control of NGOs, will force NGOs to devote valuable
resources to meeting bureaucratic demands, discourage NGOs from pursuing
innovative projects, and inject arbitrariness and the potential for corruption
into the registration process.
Despite these concerns, the effect the 1998 Regulations will have on
Chinese NGOs involved in legal reform is unclear. While the nonprofit
community expressed alarm when the 1998 Regulations were first
promulgated, some of this fear has subsided as the expected chilling effect and
the expected purge has failed to occur.441 Furthermore, according to one
person who works closely with Chinese NGOs, many NGOs involved in legal
matters exist as subdivisions of public universities and thus are considered to
be secondary or tertiary organizations.442 As secondary and tertiary
organizations, these NGOs are supervised by their parent institution and do443
not need to register with the MCA. They thus have been able to evade the
regulatory framework. If there is a direct legal threat to these NGOs, it will
not surface until the enactment of the proposed Regulations on the
Registration and Management of Institutional Units, which would apply to
NGOs that are established underneath a parent institution. 44 The content of
these proposed regulations remains unknown to the public.
Although the 1998 Regulations are not expected to prevent Chinese
NGOs from continuing their current legal reform activities, this new legal
climate does pose obstacles to the expansion of the role of NGOs in the legal
arena. First, the regulations hinder the participation of NGOs that are
organized along models different from those currently active in legal affairs.
For example, while academic-organized organizations can evade registration,
most grass-roots organizations cannot enter into existence unless they comply
with the 1998 Regulations. 445 Second, the fact that the MCA has not exercised
439. See BOUND AND GAGGED, supra note 425, at 6.
440. See id. at 6-7.
441. See Academic Interview D.
442. See id. Of the eight NGOs profiled in Part II, five were established as subdivisions or
affiliates of a public university.
443. See Academic Interview D. Other ways that groups have evaded the registration process
have been to register as a business or to remain unregistered. See id. In the past, the government seemed
willing to tolerate unregistered groups so long as they maintained a low profile and did not engage in
any politically sensitive activities. The government's current attitude is unclear. With respect to NGOs
operating under the guise of businesses, the government has sought to crack down on these NGOs by
promulgating the provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of People-Organized
Non-Enterprise Units (Minban Feiqiye Danwei Dengfi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli). These provisional
regulations subject NGOs registered as businesses to registration requirements similar to those required
under the 1998 Regulations. See Becker, supra note 407, at 17.
444. See Becker, supra note 407, at 17 (saying that the Chinese government is currently
preparing regulations on the registration and management of institutional units).
445. This prejudice against grassroots organizations perhaps reflects the fear that such
organizations, if they are able to mobilize large numbers of workers, pose a greater threat to the CCP
than advocacy for political reforms by establishment intellectuals. Cf. Pomfret, supra note 342
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its expanded authority under the 1998 Regulations to clamp down on
unregistered or more independent-minded NGOs does not mean that it will
not do so in the future. The threat is still there, and on the margin, the
possibility of MCA suppression might convince NGOs to toe the government
line more closely.
In the end, whether or not the 1998 Regulations (or the proposed
regulations covering secondary and tertiary organizations) will impede NGO
formation over the long run will most likely depend on the CCP's perception
of the threat, if any, that the nonprofit sector will pose to its authority.
Although the 1989 Regulations were implemented by CCP hard-liners as part
of a post-Tiananmen backlash against the freedom of association,44 6 they have
not prevented the dramatic growth of the Chinese nonprofit sector over the
past ten years. Furthermore, this is a growth that the Chinese leadership does
not appear to want to stop, let alone rollback.447 At worst, the 1998
Regulations represent an attempt to ensure that the state continues to direct
NGO activity; it represents the desire to control and not the desire to
eliminate. Insofar as the CCP does not feel a need to shrink the current scope
of permissible activity, the 1998 Regulations will not prevent NGOs in the
legal arena from operating as before. And insofar as the CCP believes that a
liberalization of the nonprofit sector will help the state cope with the PRC's
domestic problems, then the 1998 Regulations could become more of a
procedural annoyance than a substantive limit on NGO activity.
C. Operational Constraints: Funding and Managing Chinese NGOs
The last sets of obstacles to the expansion of NGO participation in legal
affairs are operational, arising from the financial needs and the organizational
structure of the NGOs themselves. Of these obstacles, the most severe appear
to be financial.
1. Inadequate Funding
Of the eight NGOs profiled in Part II, five have expressly identified448
inadequate funding as the most serious constraint on their activities. Three
receive most of their funding from the Ford Foundation and would be unable
(describing the Chinese leadership's fear that independent worker unions will form alliances with
democracy activists to form the Chinese equivalent of the Polish Solidarity Movement).
446. See Academic Interview D.
447. Cf Non-Public Sector Given Greater Role, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 16, 1999, available in
1999 WL 5968314 (discussing NPC approval of constitutional amendments that would "enshrine the
non-public sector"); Xi Mi, True NGOs Needed, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL
7598137 (mentioning the central government's desire to reduce the presence of government officials in
NGOs).
448. See CAUSE OF FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 143, at 5-6 (describing the
BWC's staffing problem); FUSLAC Interview A; Huazheng Interview A; SBA Interview A; CCA
Interview A; Academic Interview C.
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to sustain their work if such funding were withdrawn.449 All appear to live
hand-to-mouth, with no endowments to generate income or reserves to sustain
themselves during times of financial hardship. These budgetary constraints not
only limit the number of projects in which an NGO can engage but also
appear to place many of the NGOs in a precarious state of existence. If their
existing funding sources disappear, they are likely to wither away and die.
4 50
Inadequate funding also exacerbates staffing problems, making it difficult for
NGOs to hire and retain quality personnel.4 1 In some cases, inadequate
funding infringes on autonomy by forcing the NGO to rely on government
personnel to staff its operations.
452
Of the eight NGOs profiled, only two appeared to be financially stable.
These two, the China Consumers Association and the Law Institute, however,
receive the bulk of their operating funds from the government,453 and such
reliance on government funding, in turn, raises questions of autonomy. It
should be no surprise that the three NGOs mentioned herein that were funded
by the government 454 also have retired government officials within their
leadership ranks,455 were formed by the state instead of by private
individuals,456 and have been assigned formal supporting roles to the
government.
457
Chinese NGOs face funding problems for five reasons. The first reason
is socio-historical-namely the absence within Chinese society of a tradition
of charitable giving to strangers.458 This disinclination to give to strangers is
compounded by the communist state's past monopoly of social services. The
average Chinese citizen continues to see the state as the source for solutions to
social problems and is thus unfamiliar with the concept and value of
philanthropy.
459
The second reason is economic. Despite rapid economic growth, the
PRC remains a developing country, and the average Chinese citizen is poor by
Western standards. Social wealth has not reached a level sufficient to support
a large nonprofit sector.460 Although the rise of a new generation of wealthy
businessmen has led to greater levels of giving, the amount donated is still
461
small when compared to Western giving. Many donors tend to see their
donations as informal investments rather than charity and thus often will not
449. These three are the Wuhan Center, the BWC, and the CJS. See Academic Interview D.
450. See id.
451. See, e.g., CAUSE OF FAR REACHING SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 143, at 5-6 (describing the
BWC's staffing problem).
452. See, e.g., supra notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 288, 351 and accompanying text.
454. The three are the SBA, the Law Institute, and the CCA.
455. See supra notes 306, 352-353 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 285, 344-346 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 286, 305, 348 and accompanying text.
458. See Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 91.
459. See id. at 104.
460. See id.
461. See Academic Interview D.
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give unless they are able to reap some form of gain from the transaction or are
462granted some role in directing the activities of the NGO.
The third reason stems from a dearth of tax incentives for corporations
and private individuals to donate to charitable causes. 46  Although the
National Tax Bureau and the Ministry of Finance attempted to redress this
problem by jointly issuing a circular in March 1997 to allow charitable
contributions to cultural programs to be deductible for up to three percent of
total profits,464 it is unclear whether these new rules have resulted in a rise in
donations. Furthermore, the high rate of tax evasion in the PRC465 suggests
that the utility of these incentives are limited.
The fourth reason Chinese NGOs face funding problems is inexperience
on the part of NGOs in strategic fundraising. To date, most fundraising has
been haphazard.46 Deficiencies in the Chinese legal regime hamper capital
formation, thereby preventing Chinese NGOs from accumulating large
endowments with which to sustain their operations.467 Only recently have
NGO leaders begun to realize the importance of taking systematic steps
toward cultivating reliable, long-term sources of revenue.
468
The last reason is a lack of public accountability. Inconsistent
accounting and a lack of transparency make it difficult for outsiders to assess
the fiscal soundness of Chinese NGOs, which in turn leads potential donors to
hesitate on making contributions.
469
An expansion of the Chinese nonprofit sector therefore requires both
specific reforms directed at enabling Chinese NGOs to be financially self-
sufficient as well as broader socioeconomic changes within Chinese society.
Specific reforms could include (1) the expansion of tax incentives for
charitable giving, (2) the implementation of laws on the corporate governance
of nonprofit entities, with such laws being tailored in a way that would aid
capital accumulation, (3) a loosening of the restrictions on donations from
foreign sources, (4) clear auditing guidelines for NGOs, and (5) requiring
public disclosure of the financial statements of NGOs. The value of such
reforms, however, would be limited until more fundamental change occurs in
the PRC. If the PRC is to fund a strong nonprofit sector, it cannot do so until
462. See id.
463. See Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 102.
464. See id.
465. See Rowan Callick, Untouchables Getting a Feel for China's Lost Billions, AUSTRALIAN
FIN. REv., Mar. 17, 1999, at 1; China Recovers 20 BIn Yuan in Tax Defaults in 1998, AFX News, Jan.
13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10489910; Damian Wild, Chinese Look to Foreign Experts To Tackle
Tax, Accr. AGE, Aug. 13, 1998, at 2; see also Frank Langfitt, Yes to Maoism, No to the Tax Collector:
Chinese Village Prospers by Avoiding Levies, BALT. SUN, Mar. 26, 1999, at 14A (describing unpaid
taxes as a "chronic problem" in the PRO).
466. See Academic Interview D.
467. See Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 103-04.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 106-07.
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the country is wealthier, has established an effective tax collection system,
and has convinced its population of the value of philanthropy.
2. Inadequate Management
On the operational side, two problems confront Chinese NGOs. The first
problem is a lack of strategic foresight. Although all eight NGOs profiled
herein expressed high aspirations for the future, none expressed a plan for
long-term growth or a strategy for achieving these aspirations. According to
one source familiar with three of these NGOs, this lack of concrete plans for
organizational development and for strengthening internal structures to
support the long-term operation of the NGO is commonplace.470 The young
age of many of these NGOs and the idealism with which they were founded
means that many are focused on producing immediate results but pay scant
attention to sustainability. Some also suffer identity crises, engaging in a
plethora of projects without concentrating on developing core
competencies.
The second problem is endemic among many first-generation NGOs
worldwide. 472 NGOs not established by the government are often formed by
strong-minded, well-connected individuals. Such NGOs frequently derive
their legitimacy from their leaders' prestige and often are effective because of
their leaders' ties with the government. But while a powerful leader can be an
asset to an NGO-and perhaps a necessity if the NGO is to engage in more
activist projects-excessive reliance on the leader can prevent the NGO from
developing a separate institutional identity. Such over-reliance also can
prevent the NGO from developing the capability, as an institution, to continue
to function effectively without the leader.
CONCLUSION
The study of the Chinese nonprofit sector's contribution to legal reform
is still in an infant stage. Most academic articles on and most media coverage
of law-related NGO activity in the PRC have focused largely on the
development of legal aid clinics. 473 With respect to NGOs in general, although
some scholarly literature discusses the history of social organizations in
Chinaa74-examining whether civil society existed in imperial China or
debating whether civil society exists in the modem PRC-to date, there has
been no comprehensive survey of nonprofit activity in the PRC. This absence
of comprehensive data means that studies such as this one are subject to
470. See id.
471. See id.
472. See Academic Interview D.
473. See, e.g., Luo, supra note 10; Assistance for Weak, supra note 220; Guangzhou's Legal
Assistance System Maturing, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETwoRK, Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7560065;
Huang, supra note 30; Shi Lihong, Legal Aid Office Helps Needy, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 24, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 11203896; see also Yang, supra note 94, at 191 (describing newspaper coverage
of the Wuhan Center).
474. See, e.g., Brook, supra note 62; Brook & Frolic, supra note 57; Frolic, supra note 58.
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methodological limitations. The case-study method, while useful in providing
examples of what a few specific organizations have done, cannot claim
conclusively to do more than that. It remains unclear whether the type of
activities described in this Article represent the whole of NGO activity in the
legal arena.
In particular, although this Article attempts to paint a broad picture of
NGO activity in legal affairs, its findings should be evaluated with three
caveats in mind. First, all of the NGOs profiled herein either are national-level
organizations, local but still at the level of a major municipality, or affiliated
with a prominent educational institution. There is no examination of NGO
activity at more local levels or in rural areas. Second, none of the NGOs
profiled herein can be described as grass-root organizations. All were
organized either under legislative mandate or by members of the nation's
educated elite. Insofar as these NGOs have successfully contributed to the rule
of law, a key reason for their success derives from the power, prestige, and
access afforded by the elite composition of their membership or by the
government ties of their leaders. The effectiveness of more populist
organizations remains unknown. Third, as mentioned before, my reliance on
first-person interviews for much of the information used in these case studies
means that my portrayal of the NGOs profiled herein will reflect the biases of
the people with whom I spoke. The difficulty with obtaining independent
confirmation of many of their assertions means that my analysis could be
based on inaccurate information.
On a substantive level, the findings herein caution against believing that
Chinese NGOs will play a pervasive role in defining the Chinese legal
landscape anytime soon. As Part I demonstrates, severe political, legal, and
organizational obstacles hinder NGO development in the PRC. Furthermore,
many of the features that make NGOs effective in the West are diluted by the
CCP's efforts to maintain control over the nonprofit sector. For instance,
initiative and the potential for a multiplicity of actors to engage in the same
field are among the nonprofit sector's strongest advantages, but insofar as the
Chinese leadership continues to permit government-created NGOs to
monopolize certain fields, diversity of action is stifled.
That said, the argument for the development of a vibrant nonprofit sector
in the PRC does not rest on any belief that NGOs are superior to government
or private actors in promoting legal reform. It comes from the belief that the
state, private actors, and NGOs can function within a complex web of
cooperation and mutual checks-and-balances. It envisions NGOs not as
competing with private actors and the government for a bigger piece of the
legal reform pie but as stepping in to fill certain gaps. The eight NGOs
profiled in this Article have demonstrated at least eleven ways in which
Chinese NGOs can fill these gaps. They have filled these gaps despite being
subject to political, legal, and organizational obstacles which impede their
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effectiveness. They have asserted independence in creative ways while
working within the confines of state-led civil society. In short, the experiences
of the eight NGOs profiled herein demonstrate that the sprouts of NGO
involvement in legal affairs have emerged in the PRC.
Whether or when these sprouts will develop into a full-fledged forest is
beyond the scope of this Article, but if the Chinese nonprofit sector continues
to expand as it has in the past several years, then there is hope. In all areas of
Chinese society, we have begun to see a move from the top-down approach to
social organization originally practiced by the government toward a more
bottom-up approach. This trend is visible in the Chinese nonprofit sector.475 It
is clear that the Chinese nonprofit sector cannot blossom without the existence
of a strong legal framework. As the NGOs profiled in this Article show,
however, the nonprofit sector itself, limited as its role currently might be, can
nevertheless be an important force in creating and sustaining this framework.
475. See Xin & Zhang, supra note 58, at 110.
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